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focused on the board of directors as a site of inquiiy and noted a shift in 
the board's animating philosophy. It is argued the board's role is evolving 
from that of a passive stamp of acquiescence to an agent of reform. The 
current emphasis on the board raises a foundational question. In the 
context of a globally competitive marketplace and the transnational 
knowledge society, what are the appropriate characteristics of a corporate 
director? And more pointedly, has the dominant normative discourse 
surrounding this question resulted in an exclusionaiy cultural monolith? 
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privilege? 
This paper explores the intersections of Canadian corporate 
law/governance and race/gender. Part I I illustrates the governance 
landscape in Canada vis-a-vis statistics on coiporate board composition. 
In doing so, a culture of widespread homogeneity is revealed. Following 
this, I offer possible rationales for the figures with reference to the so-
called "pool problem" and issues of implicit cognitive bias. With respect 
to the latter, I rely on psychological science literature in an attempt to 
explicate the cognitive processes and stmctures that inform corporate 
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approach has value and is attractive as a political strategy, I also express 
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In Part IV, I canvass potential avenues for reform. Most importantly, I 
argue that aspects of the legal culture and practice that shape corporate 
activity should be revisited. The cuiTent system - as it relates to the 
director nomination process, shareholder proposals and existing 
govemance principles - may ultimately serve to facilitate board 
homogeneity and to undermine future diversification initiatives. In Part V, 
I delineate four underexplored areas for future research and offer 
concluding remarks. I suggest that issues of board composition should be 
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TOWARDS A R A C E AND GENDER-CONSCIOUS 
CONCEPTION OF T H E F I R M : CANADIAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, LAW AND DIVERSITY 
Aaron A. Dhir* 
When I look to my left and I look to the right and I want to 
talk to a feUow sister or a fellow brother or get their 
analysis on something, there isn't one, and that's the reahty 
of the [company] fabric and the culture;' 
- Canadian Black female corporate manager/ 
executive, 2008 
[W]hen we are in a dominant group we must remember the 
power relations that regulate why those in subordinate 
groups would not want to look us in the eye. ^ 
- Razack, Lookmg White People in the Eye 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. Aspects of this 
paper were presented at the 8th Annual Critical Race and Anticolonial Studies 
Conference titled "Race-ing Hegemonies, Resurging Imperialisms; Building Anti-Racist 
and Anti-Colonial Theory and Practice for Our Times" (Ryerson University, November 
16, 2008). I am grateftil to Ed Waitzer, Stephanie Ben-lshai, Mihkel Voore & Vincent-
Joel Proulx for their detailed comments on earlier drafts and to Peer Zumbansen, Poonam 
Puri, Doreen McBarnet, Carmela Murdocca, Allan Hutchinson & Sara Slinn for engaging 
in thoughtful discussions on topics related to this text. I acknowledge with appreciation 
the excellent research assistance of Reena Kotecha and Jessica DiFederico and the 
tremendous research contributions and dedication of Anna Gersh. This work is supported 
by a 2008 Border Ladner Gervais Research Fellowship. 
' Catalyst, "Career Advancement in Coiporate Canada; A Focus on Visible Minorities ~ 
Workplace Fit and Stereotyping" (2008) at 20 (citation omitted) [Catalyst, "Workplace 
Fit"]. 
' S.H. Razack, ioo^//?g White People in Ihe Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in 
Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 22. 
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L INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship in law and corporate govemance has focused on the 
board of directors as a site of inquiry and, in the aftermath of corporate 
scandals/governance failures, has noted a shift in the board's animating 
philosophy. In the "emerging board-centered system of corporate 
governance", it is argued the board's role is evolving from that of a 
passive stamp of acquiescence to an agent of reform.^ Without question, a 
significant feature of corporate law is the managerial authority that is 
statutorily vested in the board.'* While directors of public companies will, 
of course, delegate day to day management decisions to officers,^ the 
board undertakes various essential tasks - the selection and appointment 
of officers, the establishment of compensation policies, monitoring of 
managerial performance, making fundamental determinations of coiporate 
policy/strategic direction etc.^  The board, in theory, serves to counteract 
the agency problem presented by the existence of a Ml-time class of 
administrative officials who may be tempted to pursue their own 
individual interests.' Further, under corporation legislation, certain 
functions are expressly prohibited from delegation to management^  and 
S. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance m Theoiy and Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 2 [Bainbridge, "The New Coiporate Governance"]. 
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 102(1) ("Subject to any 
unanimous shareholder agreement, the directors shall manage, or supei-vise the 
management of, the business and affairs of a coiporation.") ["CBCA"]. This piece 
addresses the governance stmctures of companies in articles of incoiporation 
jurisdictions, which are the most prevalent in Canada (e.g. Ontario, federal incorporation 
under the CBCA). It wil l not discuss memorandum and articles of association 
jurisdictions (e.g. British Columbia, Nova Scotia) or letters patent jurisdictions (e.g. 
Prince Edward Island). Further, my analysis focuses primarily on corporations that issue 
securities for public distribution/are the subject of securities regulation. 
' CBCA, ibid, ss. 121(a). 
" Lucian A. Bebchuk, "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise" (2007) 93 Va. L. Rev. 
675 at 680 [Bebchuk, "The Myth"]. See also Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll, 
"Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons From Enron" (2008) 103 
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 153 at 155 ("the ultimate 
decisionmaking authority rests with the board of directors") (citation omitted). 
' Bebchuk, ibid, at 679 (citation omitted). 
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recent studies suggest that boards "increasingly view delegation of 
authority to management as properly the subject of careful and self-
conscious decision-making."' 
As observed by Professor Bebchuk, "[gjiven the central role of the 
board, selecting directors with the appropriate abilities and characteristics 
is important."''' In Canada, this sentiment carries particular resonance in 
light of the Supreme Court's December 2008 reasons for decision in BCE 
Inc. The Court provides a strong re-affirmation of the business judgment 
rule in stating that "deference should be accorded to business decisions of 
directors taken in good faith and in the performance of the functions they 
were elected to perform by the shareholders."" This raises a foundational 
question - in the context of a globally competitive marketplace and the 
transnational knowledge society, what exactly are the "appropriate" 
characteristics of Canadian corporate directors whose decisions should be 
afforded deference? And more pointedly, has the dominant normative 
discourse surrounding this question resulted in an exclusionary cultural 
monolith? Has it served to preserve existing status hierarchies/structures 
of identity privilege? 
This paper explores the intersections of Canadian coiporate 
law/governance and race/gender. To date, the confluence of these fields 
' CBCA, supra note X, ss. 121(a) and ss. 115(3). 1, of course, do not mean to overplay 
the director vs. senior management distinction. The dynamic between the two groups is 
quite nuanced and frequently, for example, senior executives will also sit on the board. 
This is allowed pursuant to ss. 121(b) of the CBCA, supra note X. That being said, non-
management/outside directors "now comprise the majority of board memberships in 
Canadian public corporations..." See Robert Yalden et. al., Business Organizations: 
Principles, Policies, and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) at 340 (citation 
omitted). 
' Bainbridge, "The New Coiporate Governance", supra note X at 199 (citation omitted). 
'° Bebchuk, "The Myth", supra note X at 675. 
" BCE Inc. V. 1976Debentureholders, (2008) S.C.C. 69, online: Supreme Court of 
Canada 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2008/2008scc69/2008scc69.htn-il> at para. 99 ["BCE 
Inc."]. 
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has garnered httle attention in Canadian academic legal literature. 
Traditionally, the two have lived in remote houses and had few occasions 
to speak to one another and to establish points of mutual concern.'^ And 
yet almost 25 years ago, Professor Lahey argued that "the impacts of 
corporate cultures are not...marginal to the experiences of women" and 
bemoaned "the relationship between patriarchal culture and the 
development of business corporations."' And as further noted by 
Professor Haney Lopez, "[r]ace sufftises all bodies of law...even "the 
purest of corporate law questions within the most unquestionably Anglo 
scholarly paradigm.""'^ 
My discussion proceeds in 4 subsequent parts. Part I I illustrates 
the govemance landscape in Canada vis-a-vis statistics on corporate board 
composition. In doing so, a culture of widespread homogeneity is 
revealed. Following this, I offer possible rationales for the figures with 
reference to the so-called "pool problem" and issues of implicit cognitive 
bias. With respect to the latter, I rely on psychological science literature in 
an attempt to explicate the cognitive processes and stmctures that inform 
corporate decision-making. Drawing on available identity narratives, I 
then consider how unconscious discrimination manifests itself in the 
everyday lives of subordinated groups within the corporation. In this 
section, I explore aspects of organizational socialization and the spaces in 
which identity-fomiation takes place. 
Thoughtful exceptions include Janis SaiTa, "Class Act: Considering Race and Gender 
in the Corporate Boardroom" (2005) 79 St. John's L. Rev. 1I2I [Sarra, "Class A c f ] and 
Janis Sarra, "The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change" (2002) 1 
Seattle Journal for Social Justice 457 [Sarra, "The Gender Implications"]. See also Allan 
C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Govemance for a Democratic 
Society (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 252 (approaching the issue from the perspective of 
democratic theoiy). 
In the U.S. context. Professor Langevoort writes that the fields of corporate governance 
and employment/discrimination law "almost never talk to each other." See Donald C. 
Langevoort, "Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, 
and the Corporate Promotion Tournament" (2004) 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1615 at 1615. 
Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter. "Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal 
Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543 at 570, 
571. 
Ian F. Haney Lopez, "The Social Construction of Race: Some Obsei-vations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice" (1994) 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 at 4 (citations omitted). 
2009] A RACE & GENDER-CONSCIOUS CONCEPTION OF THE FIRM 5 
Part I I I examines attempts by Canadian civil society organizations 
and other commentators to cast board diversification in terms of 
organizational performance; in other words, the argument that a 
heterogeneous board correlates to a more profitable, value-generating 
business. I review the economic/organizational/govemance literature in 
order to establish whether this claim can, in fact, be empirically 
established. To the extent that it can, I suggest Canadian corporations may 
actually be perpetuating corporate cultures that actively stifle factors 
which might otherwise enable them to successfully leverage diversity. 
Further, while I acknowledge the market-based approach has value and is 
attractive as a political strategy, I also express reservations and contend 
that it should be employed with caution. 
In Part IV, I canvass potential extra-legal and legal avenues for 
reform. Most importantly, in contemplating the "contours of a new (and 
more inclusive) govemance architecture","' I argue that aspects of the 
legal culture and practice that shape corporate activity should be revisited. 
The cument system - as it relates to the director nomination process, 
shareholder proposals and existing govemance principles - may ultimately 
serve to facilitate board homogeneity and to undermine fiiture 
diversification initiatives. In Part V, I delineate 4 underexplored areas for 
future research and offer concluding remarks. Chief among these are 
areas 3 and 4, with the common denominator of both being the suggestion 
that issues of board composition should be of concem not just to those 
who are preoccupied with corporate governance, but also to those who are 
concemed by the human rights-related impacts of Canadian transnational 
corporate activity. 
I I . A CORPORATE CULTURE O F HOMOGENEITY 
A . T H E STATISTICS 
Edward Waitzer, "Talcing a Longer Term View: Why Pension Fund Managers Should 
Take the Lead" at 1 (unpublished, on file with author). 
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The representation of women and raciahzed persons on Canadian 
corporate boards is strikingly low and not reflective of Canada's cuiTcnt 
demographics and labour market availability. Women constitute just more 
than 50 percent of the Canadian population.And yet, in 2007 they held 
only 13 percent of the director positions of Financial Post 500 companies. 
This was an improvement of just 1 percent from 2005. Further, in 2007 
more than 40 percent of these corporations employed no female directors 
at all and just 3.4 percent had women chairing the board.'^ Another recent 
study found the volume of Canadian female board members to be " 1 5 % 
less than the comparable U.S . boards."" In fact, the reality is even more 
severe than these statistics indicate given that some women occupy 
multiple board seats. 
Statistics Canada, "Women in Canada: A Gender-Based Statistical Report" (5th. ed., 
2006) at 11. 
Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census of Women Board Directors of the FP500 - Voices 
from the Boardroom" (2008) [Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census"] at 3. In the U.S., 
women occupy 14.8 percent of Fortune 500 director positions. In Europe, they hold 9.7 
percent of FTSEurofirst 300 Index board seats. See Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census of 
Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500" (2007), online: 
<\vww.catalvst.org/publication/I2/2007-catalvst-census-of-women-board-directors-of-
the-fortune-500> and European Professional Women's Network, "Third Biannual 
European? WN BoardWomen Monitor 2008" (2008) at 1, 7, online: 
<www.europeanpwn.net/files/3rd bwm 2008 press release l.pdf>. For a discussion of 
the Australian experience, see Alison Sheridan & Gina Milgate "Accessing Board 
Positions: A Comparison of Female and Male Board Members' Views" (2005) 13 
Coiporate Governance: An International Review 847. 
" Spencer Stuart, "Canadian Board Index: Board Trends and Practices at Leading 
Canadian Companies, 2006" (2007) at 17. 
'" Over the last 3 years, individuals who were existing members of FP500 boards filled 
approximately 33 percent of public corporation seats. Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census", 
supra note X at 3. 
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Racialized groups '^ account for over 16 percent of Canada's 
population. From 2001 to 2006, these groups grew at a pace that exceeded 
the overall growth rate by 5 times.^ ^ Further, persons bom outside Canada 
represent 19.8 percent of the overall populace - the largest amount in the 
last 75 years.^ ^ Over the next 3 years, it is anticipated that immigrants 
"will account for 100 percent of Canada's net labour force growth".^'' 
Most germane for present purposes, 75 percent of immigrants are 
racialized^^ with the majority of recent immigrants having been born in the 
Middle East and Asia.^ *' Despite this, studies indicate that racialized 
directors occupy a dismal 1.7 percent of Canadian corporate directorships 
and that our firms are noticeably outperformed by comparable U.S. firms 
on issues of racial/ethnic board diversity.^' 
Federal legislation uses the term "visible minorities" and defines members of this 
group as "persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-
white in colour". See Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44, ss. 3. There are 
undoubtedly numerous complications associated with the categorization of racial/ethnic 
identity. Scholars have expressed trepidation with "visible minority" and a preference 
instead for the term "racialized", which wil l be used most frequently in this paper. See 
Grace-Edward Galabuzi, Canada's Economic Apartheid: The Social Exclusion of 
Racialized Groups in the New Century (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2006) at xvi 
- xvii (""visible minority".. .implies permanence of minority status that is imposed on the 
population. Racialized denotes that process of imposition, the social constmction of the 
categoiy, and the attendant experience of oppression as opposed to the seemingly neutral 
terms "visible minorities" or "racial minorities," which have the effect of masking the 
oppressions.") 
' ' Statistics Canada, "Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census: National Picture" (4 
April 2008), online: 
<http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/engHsh/census06/analvsi.s/ethnicorigin/visible.cfm>. 
Statistics Canada, "2006 Census: Immigration, Citizenship, Language, Mobility and 
Migration" (4 December 2007), online: 
<http://www.statcan.ca/Dailv/EngUsh/071204/d071204a.htm> [Statistics Canada, "2006 
Census"]. 
' ' Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 2. 
'' Ibid, (citation omitted). 
' ' Statistics Canada, "2006 Census", supra note X. 
' ' Spencer Stuart & Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, "The Canadian Board 
Index: Board Trends and Practices at Leading Canadian Companies - Building and 
Retaining Director Talent in Challenging Times" (2003) at 5. See also Conference Board 
of Canada, "Business Critical: Maximizing the Talents of Visible Minorities" (2005) at 1 
(citing Christine L. Taylor/Conference Board of Canada, "Dimensions of Diversity in 
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A further study analyzed, inter alia, the top 50 of the Report on 
Business 1000 and/or the Financial Post 500, as well as firms listed in the 
S&P/TSX 60. Of the corporations reviewed, almost one-quarter had no 
female directors and three-quarters had no racialized directors.^ ^ Of the 
S&P/TSX 60 in particular,^' the most current statistics indicate that 87 
percent of firms (i.e. 52/60) have no racialized directors.Perhaps most 
disturbing are the results of the latest Canadian Spencer Stuart Board 
Index. The annual report examines the governance practices of Canada's 
100 most economically significant public corporations.^' In addition to 
noting that the level of women directors "has not increased meaningfirlly 
since 2003", the 2007 study concluded that "[b]oard recruitment of visible 
minorities is not, presently, on the agenda of [the] surveyed companies."^^ 
Canadian Business: Building a Business Case for Valuing Ethnocultural Diversity 
(1995)). In the U.S., racialized individuals hold 15.4 percent of Fortune 100 director 
positions. See The Alliance for Board Diversity, "Women and Minorities on Fortune 100 
Boards" (2008) at 5. In the U.K., a recent study surveyed the board composition of 543 
companies, representing more than 90 percent of the overall market capitalization of 
London Stock Exchange-listed firms. The study gathered full data on race/ethnicity for 
463 of these firms and found that the average board was made up of 8.7 white directors 
and only 0.2 racialized directors. See Stephen Brammer, Andrew Millington & Stephen 
PaveUn, "Gender and Ethnic Diversity Among UK Coi-porate Boards" (2007) 15:2 
Coiporate Governance: An International Review 393 at 396, 398. 
Melissa Shin, "Minority Report" (2007) Corporate Knights Cleantech Issue 34 at 35. 
' ' The 60 largest corporations listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in terms of overall 
market capitalization. 
Melissa Shin, "Best 50 Corporate Citizens" (2008) Corporate Knights Best 50 Issue 14 
at 15. See also Press Release, "Shoppers Drug Mart Top Corporate Citizen in Canada" 
(20 June 2006), online: Corporate ICnights <www.coiporateknights.ca/in-the-press/72-
press-releases/257-shoppers-drug-mart-top-corporate-citizen-in-canada.html> ("[a]t the 
board level, for a society as diverse as ours, Canadian companies have a stunningly low 
number of visible minorities"). 
Spencer Stuart, "Canadian Board Index: Board Trends and Practices at Leading 
Canadian Companies, 2007" (2008) at 2. 
Ibid, at 16, 15. A recent survey of both public and private sector organizations in 
Canada found that 42 percent of respondents did not have a strategic plan aimed at 
diversity enhancement. Further, 25 percent felt their institution had insufficient capacity 
to properly train leaders in managing a diverse employee base. See Conference Board of 
Canada, "Priorities, Practices and Performance in Canadian Organizations" (November 
2006) at 11, 19. 
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So then, as noted in studies regarding board diversity in other jurisdictions, 
there appears to be httle questioning on the part of the dominant class of 
the structural inequality that maintains its dominance.The racial and 
gendered aspects of this dominance are missing from the radar of those 
who are privileged by it.^'' 
B . POSSIBLE R A T I O N A L E S 
The under-representation of women and racialized persons in the 
boardroom is puzzling from the perspective of business strategy. Why 
would firms actively "underutilize any segment of the talent pool" as 
opposed to attempting to harness the available potential?^^ 
1. THE "POOL PROBLEM" 
There appears to be a disconnect between the current state of the 
Canadian labour market and top corporate decision-makers' perception of 
that market. Canadian firms have explained the low levels of 
representation on their boards and in senior management positions as a 
fimction of "a shortage of qualified women"^^ and "the lack of quahfied 
visible minority candidates" '^ (i.e. the so-called "pool problem"). This 
response necessarily raises questions of what attributes are assigned value 
by Canadian businesses and whether the selection criteria currently 
Alison Sheridan & Gina Milgate, ""She Says, He Says"; Women's and Men's Views 
of the Composition of Boards" (2003) I8;3 Women in Management Review 147 at 152 
[Sheridan & Milgate, "She Says"]. 
atl53. 
Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 1. 
Ronald J. Burke, "Women on Corporate Boards of Directors; Views of Canadian Chief 
Executive Officers" (1994) 9;5 Women in Management Review 3 at 8 [Burke, "Women 
on Corporate Boards"]. See also Elizabeth Church, "Women Still Missing at the Table" 
The Globe and Mail (23 October 2002), online; 
<http;//wvvw.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/stoiv/RTGAM.20061023.wboardgames2003-
gender/BNStorv/bgames03/home?pageRequested=all> ("another common argument [is] 
that there are not enough qualified women to take board seats"). 
Conference Board of Canada, "Toward Maximizing the Talents of Visible Minorities; 
Potential, Performance and Organizational Practices" (2004) at 5 [Conference Board of 
Canada, "Toward Maximizing"]. 
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applied are unduly restrictive (for example, being overly hesitant to 
consider candidates lacking C-suite experience instead of focusing on 
actual skills). Upon deeper consideration, however, it may not be 
necessary to resolve these issues as the statistical evidence does not appear 
to frilly support the perception of a widespread pool problem.^^ On the 
contrary, a recent federal government study concluded for example that 
"less than half of the visible minorities who were qualified for senior 
manager positions were actually in those positions. Over half, while 
qualified, were not."^^ 
The overall proposition that racialized candidates are under-
included in the upper echelons of certain sectors in comparison to their 
labour market availabihty has been confirmed in subsequent studies."*^  
This lack of inclusion takes place within a broader context of the 
devaluation of immigrant skills and academic credentials in Canada (as 
previously noted, 75 percent of Canadian immigrants are members of 
racialized groups).''' Empirical studies demonstrate that 1 year of foreign-
obtained employment experience is valued at approximately 33 percent of 
the equivalent domestic experience. And on average, foreign university 
training obtained by a racialized immigrant yields a benefit that is less 
It is interesting to note that a gender dimension is possibly at play. Studies in other 
jurisdictions indicate that when asked why men dominate coiporate directorships, men 
tend to attribute the imbalance to a pool problem, whereas women are more likely to 
explain it as a function of the firm's hostility towards female directors. See Sheridan & 
Milgate, "She Says", supra note X at 150. 
Conference Board of Canada, "Toward Maximizing", supra note X at 5 (citing Human 
Resources and Skills Development Canada, "The Annual Report - Employment Equity 
Act 2003" (2004)). While the Conference Board study uses the term "qualified" the 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada report uses the term "labour market 
availabihty". However, it should be noted that there is no dissonance between the two -
i.e. "availability" refers to the number of individuals in the labour market that are 
qualified to perfonn a specific job. Further, government availability estimates actually 
tend to be quite conservative. Telephone conversation between Ms. Anna Gersh and Mr. 
Michel Lefebvre, Compliance Review Supei-visor, Employment Equity - Canadian 
Human Rights Commission (15 July 2008). 
See, for example, Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2007 Annual Report of the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services, 2008) at 26. 
' ' See note X above. 
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than 33 percent of the benefit derived from a domestic degree earned by a 
Canadian-bom individual.''^ This pattem creates a significant downward 
pressure on immigrant income levels and thwarts attempts at meaningful 
employment (and broader societal) integration.''^ Raciahzed persons are 
relegated to certain forms of work and economic sectors and face a 
systematic discounting of their human capital. The resulting 
marginalization has been described by one scholar as a form of Canadian 
"economic apartheid".'*'* Further, there is a significant gender dimension 
at play, as female newcomers in each immigration group realize 
"significantly worse" employment outcomes as compared to male 
newcomers who are similarly situated in terms of age and area of 
occupation.'*^ 
2. IMPLICIT COGNITIVE BIASES 
I f the pool problem is more a matter of perception than reality, 
what other barriers exist to the advancement of racialized persons and 
women to Canadian directorships? Psychological science literature in the 
area of implicit cognitive biases may shed some necessary light. 
Naomi Abloim, Ross Finnie & Ronald Meng, "The Discounting of Immigrants' Skills 
in Canada: Evidence and Policy Recommendations" (2005) 11:2 IRPP Choices at 13 -
14. 
Ibid, at 14. It has been estimated that remedying the lack of recognition of immigrant 
education "would enable Canadians to earn an additional $4.1 billion to $5.9 billion in 
income annually". See Michael Bloom & Michael Grant, "Brain Gain: The Economic 
Benefits of Recognizing Learning and Learning Credentials in Canada" (Conference 
Board of Canada, 2001) at I . See also Conference Board of Canada, "Performance and 
Potential 2004-05: How Can Canada Prosper in Tomon-ow's World?" (2005) at 120 
("Our national failure to recognize immigrants' learning and learning credentials costs 
340,000 immigrants in the range of $3.4-5.0 billion annually in lost earnings due to 
unemployment and underemployment effects"). 
Galabuzi, supra note X at xiii - xiv. See also Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X 
at 8 ("[m]any Canadian companies say that they overlook immigrants in their human 
resources planning; don't hire immigrants at the level at which they were trained; and 
have difficulty integrating recent immigrants into the workforce") (citation omitted). 
' ' Lesleyanna Hawthorn, "The Impact of Economic Selection Policy on Labour Market 
Outcomes for Degree-Qualified Migrants in Canada and Australia" (2008) 14:5 IRRP 
Choices at 26. 
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Implicit social cognitions are a form of "unconscious cognitive 
involvement".''^ Judgments are instinctively generated without an 
individual intending to do so'" and they may even contradict the 
individual's explicitly articulated philosophies/beliefs.'*^ Levels of 
implicit bias are measured via a social psychology tool known as the 
"Implicit Association Tesf. With respect to race, a study analyzing the 
results of 2.5 milhon completed tests reveals that almost 70% of 
participants exhibited White-positive, Black-negative biases.'" Applying 
these concepts to the sphere of corporate govemance, a recent U.S. study 
in the field of applied psychology examined the issue of race and 
corporate leadership through the lens of leadership categorization theory. 
Whether an individual is permitted to assume a leadership position is 
partially contingent on an evaluation of his/her leadership competencies. 
Such evaluations will be most positive i f the individual is thought to 
demonstrate characteristics that fit within an overall leadership organizing 
principle or prototype.^'' Startlingly, the authors found that "being white" 
is viewed as a characteristic of the leadership prototype. Consequentially, 
evaluations are more apt to prefer whites over racialized persons, with the 
former being judged as "more effective leaders" and as possessing "more 
leadership potential". ^' As such, the former "may be more likely to be 
promoted to leadership positions more frequently than" the latter.^ ^ 
A. G. Greenwald & M . R. Banaji, "Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, 
and Stereotypes" (1995) 102 Psychological Rev. 4 at 5. 
A. G. Greenwald & L. H. Krieger, "Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations" (2006) 94 
Cal. L.Rev. 945 at 951. 
' ' Brian A. Nosek et. al., "Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes" (2007) 18 European Rev. of Social Psychology 36 at 52. 
'° A.S. Rosette, G. J. Leonardelli & K.W. Phillips, "The White Standard: Racial Bias in 
Leader Categorization" (2008) 93:4 Journal of Applied Psychology 758 at 758 [Rosette, 
"The White Standard"]. 
Ibid. See also Tavia Grant, "The Might of Being White - No Matter What Their Own 
Color, Americans Still See Archetypal and Most Effective Leaders as White: Study" The 
Globe and Mail (18 July 2008), onhne: 
www.theglobeaadmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/content/subscribe?user_URL=htt]-): 
//www.theglobeandmail.con-i%2Fsen'let%2Fstorv%2FLAC.20080718.CAWH1TE 18%2F 
TPStorv%2F%3Fque&ord-I20050546&brand=theglobeandmail&forceJogin=true and 
David Maume, "Wage Discrimination over the Life Course: A Comparison of 
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The findings of this study resonate with the robust body of work on 
inter-group relationships which invariably reveals a human tendency 
towards in-group favouritism.^^ Not surprisingly, the predilection for 
one's own kind is "overwhelmingly" demonstrated by persons in groups 
that enjoy social privilege. '^* Professor Wade discusses a similar idea 
within the context of empathy. She cogently argues that White, male 
corporate managers/directors more customarily promote White males 
below them in the corporate hierarchy since they can easily empathize 
with this group, which is most akin to themselves (as opposed to, for 
example, raciahzed persons and w o m e n ) . T h e idea that monohthic 
institutions will reproduce themselves with monolithic inheritors^^ has also 
been explained as a function of trust. The corporate sphere is inherently 
unpredictable and therefore pressure inducing. Appointing someone that 
is trusted to a leadership position serves to create a sense of predictability 
and order. However, because meaningful personal relationships are not 
always present in the firm hierarchy, trust is based less on inter-personal 
awareness and more on outward indicia of similitude, such as race.^' 
Explanations" (2004) 51 Social Problems 505 at 506 ("Studies of race and gender 
differences in perfoiTaance ratings tend to show that women and black men receive lower 
ratings from supervisors than do white men, suggesting supervisors' bias against these 
groups") (citations omitted). 
' ' Rosette, "The White Standard", supra note X at 773. See also Erica Hayes James, 
"Race-Related Differences in Promotions and Support: Underlying Effects of Human and 
Social Capital" (2000) I I Organization Science 493 at 500 ("as expected, race was 
significantly and positively related to reported promotion rate and psychological support 
[of corporate managers] in such a way that being black was associated with a lower 
reported promotion rate and less psychological support than was being white"). 
ICristin A. Lane, Jeriy Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, "Implicit Social Cognition and 
Law" (2007) 3 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 427 at 433 (citations omitted) [Lane, "ImpUcit 
Social Cognition"]. 
'' Ibid, at 435 (citations omitted). 
Cheiyl L. Wade, "Corporate Governance As Coi-porate Social Responsibility: Empathy 
and Race Discrimination" (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev, 1461 at 1473. 
' ' Thomas W. Joo, "A Trip Through the Maze of 'Corporate Democracy': Shareholder 
Voice and Management Composition" (2003) 77 St. John's L. Rev. 735 at 742 [Joo, "A 
Trip"]. 
Ibid, at 742 - 743 (citing Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 
(New York: Basic Books, 1977) at 48 - 49). 
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That being said, notwithstanding the dominance of implicit social 
cognitions, these tendencies are not static or immune to development.^ ^ 
Rather, they are context dependent and capable of being modified through 
"[ejxposure to counterstereotypical outgroup members". '^ In other words, 
similar to heuristics (psychological shortcuts or intuitive judgments that 
may result in patterns of mistake), subconsciously held biases may be 
abrogated and individuals left "debiased".^ " The implication of this for 
corporate govemance and board composition is as follows: the cognitive 
biases of the predominantly White, male class of corporate directors can 
be ameliorated as these persons are progressively acquainted with 
candidates that fall outside of their existing leadership paradigms and 
engage in cross-racial/gender teaming. However, as I will argue in part IV 
below, the law and culture that inform the director election process may 
have the effect of stifling this progress. 
C. L I V E D EXPERIENCES/IDENTITY N A R R A T I V E S 
I f we accept the relevance of unconscious discrimination to board 
composition, the next logical question is how does this discrimination 
manifest itself in the everyday lives of the corporation's subordinated 
groups? In order to fiilly appreciate the weight of the issue, and before 
considering possibilities for reform, it is necessary to explore issues of 
organizational socialization and the spaces in which identity-foi-mation 
take place in the corporation. How does the finn manifest itself as a racial 
and gendered body through its identity-making practices? '^ How do firm 
processes influence women's and racialized persons' sense of place in the 
overall organizational stmcture? What are their lived experiences/identity 
narratives? 
Lane, "Implicit Social Cognition", supra note X at 437. 
'' Ibid, at 438 (citations omitted). 
'° Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, "The Law of Implicit Bias" (2006) 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
969 at 973. 
See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, "Race To The Top Of The Coiporate Ladder: 
What Minorities Do When They Get There" (2004) 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1645 at 
1657- 1659. 
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In exploring these questions, I will draw primarily (though not 
exclusively) from the literature detailing the experiences of women and 
racialized managers/directors in the U.S. and Canada.^ ^ Before doing so, I 
offer two important preliminary points. First, I am mindftil of the 
potential dangers in combining the corporate governance-related 
experiences of racialized persons and White women. In doing so, I do not 
mean to suggest that the two sets of experiences are capable of being 
conflated. Indeed, in addressing board diversity, Professor Fairfax has 
argued that "people of color appear to have experienced more significant 
barriers than women, while women of color appear to be experiencing the 
most formidable of such barriers".^ ^ It is therefore essential to remain 
cognizant of the potential for race minimization and voice appropriation.^ '* 
With that in mind, however, it has also been noted that many of the issues 
facing women in the boardroom are equally germane to raciahzed 
persons.*^ 
Second, while the use of narrative is an integral tool in social 
theory (for example, Foucault's suppressed/subjugated knowledge) and in 
critical race theory,^ ^ its use is anomalous in corporate law. Indeed, law 
I should note that to date intei-view-based research does not appear to have been 
conducted with Canadian racialized directors. As such, I will rely on the experiences of 
racialized managers/executives. 
Lisa M . Fairfax, "Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, 
People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color" (2005) 29 St. 
John's L. Rev. 1105 at 1105 (citation omitted). 
' ' Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, "Obscuring the Importance of Race: The 
Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (or other -isms)" 
(1991) Duke L.L 397 at 399ff 
" Lissa Lamkin Broome, "The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club" (2008) 33 The 
Journal of Corporation Law 665 at 679 (citation omitted). See also, for example, Ella 
L.J. Edmundson Bell & Stella M. Nkomo, Our Separate Ways: Black and Wlhte Women 
and the Struggle for Professional Identity (Boston; Harvard Business School Press, 2001) 
at 18 ("while black and white women's professional experiences vaiy, there are essential 
similarities") [Edmundson Bell, "Our Separate Ways"]. 
' ' See, for example, Richard Delgado, "Stoiytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea 
for Narrative" (1989) 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 and Margaret E. Montoya, "Celebrating 
Racialized Legal Narratives" in Francisco Valdes et. ai, eds.. Crossroads, Directions, 
And A New Critical Race Theoiy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002) at 243. 
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and economics scholars - ideologically dominant in the field - have issued 
scathing critiques of this vehicle. Consider the following comments of 
Judge Richard Posner, one of the law and economics movement's most 
prominent voices: "[rjather than marshal logical arguments and empirical 
data, critical race theorists tell stories...[they] teach by example that the 
role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a comfortable 
professional salary to write childish stories about how awful it is to be a 
member of such a g r o u p . T h e rejection of narrative as a discursive 
practice in favour of a wholly instrumental approach has rendered the 
discourse of corporate law a sort of "erasing discourse" which considers 
the personal stories existing inside the corporate form as immaterial.^^ 
And yet, when considering issues of corporate law and govemance vis-a-
vis board composition, I believe the use of narrative holds significant 
potential as a tool of consciousness-raising '^ that affords a richer, textured 
understanding of subordinated groups' organizational experiences and as a 
form of counter-hegemonic resistance to prevailing constmctions of their 
realities.'" Further, at a more utilitarian level, I believe these stories are a 
useful piece of the puzzle in interpreting the empirical literature on board 
heterogeneity and organizational performance that is discussed in part I I I 
below." 
" Richard A. Posner, "The Slcin Trade" The New Republic (13 October 1997) at 42. 
' ' Mae Kuykendall, "No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law" 
(2007) 55 Buffalo L. Rev. 537 at 541. 
® Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, "The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory" 
(2003) 112 Yale L.J. 1757 at 1785 ("[w]hen an outsider is trying to describe an 
experience to someone who cannot readily relate to it, an insider, narrative provides the 
detail that can help the insider empathize and relate to the experience"). 
atI786. 
Jean-Francois Gaudreauh-Desbiens, "The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial 
Arbitration of Conflicting NaiTatives about Law, Democracy, and Identity" (1993) 23 Vt. 
L. Rev. 793 at 798 ("for inteipretive puiposes...[identity] narratives are facts and not 
mere emotions to be discarded outright"). 
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1. RACIALIZED MANAGERS 
U.S. studies indicate tliat Black managers who have passed the 
hurdles of "access discrimination" may, nonetheless, be subject to 
"treatment discrimination". In other words, while deserving, they are 
afforded less in the way of incentives and employment opportunities as a 
result of their subordinate group status.'^  Correspondingly, these 
managers express diminished feelings of acknowledgment and approval as 
compared to their White counterparts and, overall, are more discontent 
with their employment.'^ The research further reveals that Black 
managers can be denied chances "for power and integration" within their 
firms and that this denial may have an adverse impact on their 
employment performance.''* To the extent that demographic minority 
directors are able to overcome barriers that prevent them from exercising 
influence over corporate decision-making, this is done by creating a 
"perception of similarity to the majority" (e.g. through establishing 
relevant social connections or past experiences).'^  In commenting on 
issues of organizational socialization, one Black female manager of a 
Fortune 500 firm remarked as follows: 
I had never felt so disadvantaged as a black woman...I 
entered a company where the whole world was the world of 
men. Eveiything was male culture. That's when I knew 
the feminists were right. There's a woman's culture and a 
J.H. Greenhaus, S. Parasuraman & W.M. Wormley, "Effects of Race on Organizational 
Experiences, Job Perfomiance, Evaluations and Career Outcomes" (1990) 33 Academy 
of Management Journal 64 at 64 - 65 (citation omitted). 
"/6W.at76. 
'' Ibid, at 80. In one study, almost 100 percent of Black executives surveyed felt their 
career progress had been thwarted on account of racial discrimination. See Colin 
Leinster, "Black Executives: How They're Doing" Fortune 117:2 (18 Januaiy 1988) 109, 
online: 
<http://monev.ciin.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/1988/01/18/70092/index.htm 
>. 
' ' James D. Westphal & Laurie P. Milton, "How Experience and Network Ties Affect the 
Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards" (2000) 45 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 366 at 389. 
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man's culture. They used different language, had different 
mores. I had to leam white male culture. I had to leam the 
culture of baseball and football. None of my analogies, 
none of my metaphors were appropriate. They didn't 
understand what I said. They could not believe that I was 
good for the business. It was just a bratal environment.. .a 
lonely, demoralizing experience.'^ 
Examinations of the Canadian corporate landscape reveal very 
similar findings. In a recent study surveying the experiences of South 
Asian, East Asian and Black managers/executives, members of the latter 
group were noticeably more prone to feehng that "being too identified 
with their visible minority group" was a significant impediment to their 
professional elevation, that they were excluded fiom networking 
opportunities" and that they were the subject of consistent contradictory 
standards vis-a-vis job performance and promotion.'^ Further, particular 
participants felt they were unable to establish an adequate workplace "f i t" 
because of their racial/linguistic minority status. In addition to negative 
stereotyping,'' some racialized managers in the first two groups felt they 
were cast as foreigners despite being Canadian-bom*° and others reported 
instances of accent discrimination.^' Consonant with the results of the 
Edmundson Bell, "Our Separate Ways", supra note X at 122 - 123. 
" Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 18. 
' ' Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 19. A Black women commented as 
follows: "It's not good enough to be just as good as the other person. Because the white 
boy's going to get promoted before you do, or the white girl's going to get promoted 
before you do...that's frustrating, but I think I've come to terms with it so it's just the 
way it is. It's the way the game is played." Ibid, at 20. In recounting these experiences, 
it is important to note that racialized firm members are not a monolith and that "[tjheir 
realities, their experiences and their opportunities differ." See Conference Board of 
Canada, "Toward Maximizing", supra note X at 5. 
' ' Comments of two East Asian female managers/executives are instructive: "Being 
Chinese, you're [seen as] very good with numbers and things like that. Very hard-
working, put in more hours. But...we're not [seen] as open or as sociable...", "You 
know how funny it is when people actually meet me for the first time and they say to me, 
"You don't sound Asian."" See Catalyst, "Workplace F i f , ibid, at 22. 
'"Ibid, ax A. 
'' Ibid.axn. 
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leadership categorization study discussed above, some believed they vi'ere 
held back from leadership roles because senior colleagues were not 
culturally competent^ ^ and were more hkely to give high-profile 
responsibilities to individuals from their own racial/ethnic group. '^' In 
order to be successfiil, many believed it essential to "conform to a 
"Canadian" identity" '^* in terms of altering "their style, language, and 
behaviour to better fit in with the dominant workplace culture"^^ and that 
"Canadianization" was an actual expectation of their White colleagues. 
These beliefs were rooted in observations of the few racialized persons 
who had actually been accepted in the organizational stmcture and had 
reached the upper levels of the corporate hierarchy (i.e. they had 
successfully acculturated).^' 
This aspect of what is perceived to be necessary for successfiil 
socialization within the firm is striking given that Canada prides itself on 
being a multicultural, pluralistic society. Most importantly, the process of 
assimilation has not been without consequence for those who have had it 
thmst upon them. Some participants recounted the hurdles posed by 
attempting to "Canadianize" on one hand, and attempting to preserve their 
own ethno-cultural identities on the other. Further, despite having risen to 
'' Ibid, at 10. One East Asian female study participant remarked as follows: "A leader 
who chooses.. .leaders will tiy to find.. .someone that can fit into their value system and 
their culture system. And it's really difficult to choose somebody who comes irom 
something that they don't understand and they haven't taken time to understand." Ibid. 
Catalyst & The Diversity Institute in Management & Technology, "Career 
Advancement in Corporate Canada: A Focus on Visible Minorities - Survey Findings" 
(2007) at 22 ("Even after we controlled for a range of job, demographic, and human 
capital characteristics, visible minority respondents more frequently agreed that people 
tend to "recommend people of their own ethnicity for high-visibility assignments"") 
(citations omitted) [Catalyst, "Sui^ vey Findings"]. 
' ' Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 4. 
' ' Catalyst, "Survey Findings", supra note X at 28 ("Several suggested they had 
encountered a "Canadian way of working" that was unfamiliar. This obsei-vation 
corresponded with a concern that this unfamiliarity exposed them to being perceived as 
incompetent. It also heightened their sense of being held to a higher standard of 
performance than their white/Caucasian peers"). 
' ' Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 9. 
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the task and effectively acclimatized, some felt that they were still not 
accepted.^ ^ One female South Asian participant remarked as follows: 
"[i]t will be interesting to see how many years we and our offspring will 
be asked "[w]here are you from?".. .You could be bom here, but i f you've 
got brown skin you'll be asked forever and a day, "[wjhere are you 
from?""^' It was also noted that the demands of assimilation were 
intensified in situations where colleagues from dominant groups were 
unwilling to show reciprocity in terms of taking accommodation-related 
steps. One participant observed, "[y]ou embrace the Canadian culture as 
much as you can, but at the same time you don't want to let go of your 
own values. But you're hying to change yourself and you're reaching out, 
trying to integrate.. .1 think the same kind of effort is not coming from the 
other paity...I think they really want you to totally Canadianize 
yourself"'" 
2. WHITE FEMALE MANAGERS/DIRECTORS AND ISSUES OF 
INTERSECTIONALITY 
In the U.K., female directors/managers working in male-dominated 
firm cultures have reported frequent feelings of loneliness and isolation 
and observed that their male colleagues were unwilling to take steps 
towards shaping a more inclusive, equitable atmosphere. On the contrary, 
they were intentionally deprived of support from male colleagues in order 
to see how they would cope, intentionally baited at meetings/put into traps 
or subjected to sexual harassment. They were placed in a typical catch-22 
of power dynamics - i.e. how to exercise power in a constmctive way 
while at the same time ensuring that male directors/managers were not left 
feeling threatened and vulnerable such that there might be a resulting 
adverse impact on (the women's) future career possibilities. 
Correspondingly, an internal stmggle was catalyzed where the women 
were forced to weigh the political risks of being too outspoken. 
Interestingly, in navigating this tension, the women reported a self-
transfomiation process under which they gradually became "tougher" as a 
Ibid, at 16. 
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means of self-preservation - but some characterized this transformation as 
regrettable." 
In Canada, this sort of self-transformation has been reported - and 
regretted - as well.'^ Further, female directors of Financial Post 500 
companies have recounted experiences of social alienation which result 
both in feelings of desolation and in reduced entrance to networks that 
would provide key professional relationships and information. Surveyed 
board members feel that male directors view them as mere tokens and, 
correspondingly, that they must over-perform in order to gain legitimacy. 
This is set against a backdrop of the intimidation that accompanies 
occupying the role of sole female director.'^ It is also essential to note the 
importance of informal "meetings" that take place outside of the 
boardroom. Relationships and affiliations in the corporation are regularly 
forged in gendered spaces ("from the men's washroom to the golf course") 
which serve to exacerbate the exclusion of women's voices.''* One female 
director remarked: 
Judi Marshall, "Working at Senior Management and Board Levels: Some of the Issues 
for Women" (1995) 10:3 Women in Management Review 21 at 23. 
'' B. Long & E. Morris, "Beyond Corporate Board Representation: Understanding the 
Experience of Female Directors in Canada" (2008) 5 The Workplace Rev. 10 at 12 - 13 
("one respondent stated, "On occasion I had to be more aggressive than my nature" and 
noted her discomfort with her own behavioural transformation in the boardroom.. .Others 
may have undergone a similar transformation as the product of an unconscious adaptation 
to male rules.") 
93 Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census", supra note X at 31. As one female director noted: 
"[i]t is challenging to be the only woman [who] sits around the board table.. .I 'm a veiy 
confident woman. I 'm veiy successful. I've worked with men most of my career.. .But 
to be the only woman that sits around the board table.. .it is intimidating." Ibid, at 33. 
See also Mischa Thompson & Denise Sekaquaptewa, "When Being Different Is 
Detrimental: Solo Status and the Performance of Women and Racial Minorities" (2002) 2 
Analyses of Social Issues and Public PoHcy 183 at 183 ("studies...indicate that members 
of socially disadvantaged groups, such as women and racial minorities, have more 
negative experiences as solos than do members of privileged groups, such as Whites and 
males") (citations omitted) and Alison M. Konrad & Vicki W. ICi-amer, "How Many 
Women Do Boards Need?" Harvard Business Review 84 (1 December 2006) at 22 
("[s]olo women on boards often feel isolated and marginalized"). 
Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census", ibid, at 35. 
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[The] "meetings outside the meetings" [are] an important 
element of understanding board dynamics... Those 
conversations ...take place in the washroom, during the 
coffee break. I noticed it...when I [first] sat on boards 
where there were women, and [when] you have a 
break.. .you're hanging out in the washroom chatting with 
your fellow female board colleagues saying, "So what did 
you really think about [that]?"...^«c/ it struck me that for 
all of those many years where I was in the bathroom by 
myself, there were other conversations going on next 
Here, issues of intersectionality/the fusion of multiple statuses of 
oppression are particularly germane, with studies finding that racialized 
women experience more impediments than men in gaining access to 
informal social groups given the coupling of racial discrimination with 
gender discrimination.'^ Further, the differing experiences of White and 
racialized women should be noted. Studies reveal the latter group is less 
apt to view their firm's aptitude recognition processes as equitable and to 
have been afforded chances for professional developmental. Rather, 
racialized women are more inchned: (1) to feel that promotions are based 
on connections rather than skills/substantive knowledge; (2) to experience 
a dearth of role models; (3) to report being held to heightened perfomiance 
measures as compared with others; and (4) to feel that colleagues in 
positions of power are more prone to assigning high-profile 
responsibilities to individuals from their own racial/ethnic group.'' Not 
surprisingly, they are also much more hkely to be dissatisfied with their 
positions.'^ 
It should also be noted that the business management literature on 
board cominittee membership reveals the "pervasive presence" of 
selection bias in teims of committee membership. Women tend to be 
placed on committees that are traditionally viewed as addressing 
Ibid, [empliasis added]. 
' ' Catalyst, "Workplace Fit", supra note X at 24 (citation omitted). 
' ' Catalyst, "Sui-vey Findings", supra note X at 25. 
'' Ibid, at 24. 
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"soft'Vperipheral govemance topics (e.g. public affairs) while men are 
generally assigned to committees that tackle what are perceived to be 
"hard'Vintegral topics (finance, compensation etc.).'' This is the case even 
after controlling for background/experience differentials and despite the 
colleagues or have superior qualifications. 
3. SILENCING DISSENT 
Perhaps one of the most striking points of commonality that 
transcends race and gender is the trend of forced conformity and the 
resulting silencing of dissent. In addition to the experiences noted above, 
particular Canadian racialized managers/executives have reported feeling 
"less latitude to speak up or disagree with a dominant viewpoint for fear 
this would detract from perceptions of them as competent individuals."'"' 
A smaller group of study participants felt that expressing contrary views 
might result in sanction or even job loss.'"^ In the U.S., a survey of female 
inside directors of Fortune 1,000 companies reveals that particular 
business cultures entrench exclusionary processes that serve to 
marginahze and disempower women and to thwart their full engagement 
on the board (e.g. omission from key client meetings etc.). Moreover, 
comments received from male superiors/colleagues demonstrate a desire 
to stifle expression and encourage compliance: 
"He [the CEO] said to me, you really irritate [a male 
director's name] so the less said is probably the better...he 
basically told me I need to adapt my style for the time 
period with the board.. .just make my points and shut up. 
Male colleagues early on said 'the male minds actually 
think differently than you do and you need to be cognizant 
Diana Bilimoria & Sandy ICristin Piderit, "Board Committee Membership: Effects of 
Sex-Based Bias" (1994) 37 Academy of Management Journal 1453 at 1465. 
""'/ZJ/O'. at 1469, 1471. 
Catalyst, "Survey Findings", supra note X at 29. 
fact that female directors qualified as their male 
102 Ibid. 
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of the fact that i f you put somebody down at a meeting, 
you're thinking that you're just saying no that's not right. 
But half the males in the room are thinking God dam that 
bitch. She's embarrassing me in front of the other 
males".'"^ 
Year after year...names of prominent, "highly qualified" 
women would be proposed, including, once, a Nobel 
Laureate. These women were rejected, our source said, 
typically because they were perceived as "too strong...[the 
other directors] wanted someone nice and non-
confroversial, someone who wouldn't rock the 
boat."..."They don't want someone who will shake the tree 
too much."'"'* 
As I discuss below, this fiend has noteworthy negative 
repercussions for a firm's govemance. As well, the requirement of having 
to silence one's own voice may contradict both a director's views on what 
is best for the corporation and his/her own personal beliefs. Carl McCall, 
while a member of Tyco International's board, counseled other Black 
directors that they had a duty to consistently raise concems over 
boardroom equity.'"^ While racialized directors may not wish to be 
typecast as the "minority voice", what are the implications for those who 
do wish to raise diversity issues but are effectively prevented from doing 
so? What are the resulting psychological processes and how do they effect 
the director's ability to perform his/her tasks and his/her sense of 
belonging in the overall organizational stmcture? 
Deborah Dahlen Zelechowski & Diana Bihmoria, "The Experience of Women 
Corporate Inside Directors" (2003) 18:7 Women in Management Review 376 at 379. 
"Views from Women on Fortune 500 Boards" (1992) 1:9 Dataline, online: Datahne 
<http://cvberwerks.com/dataline/mapping/womenonfhtmi>. 
Cora Daniels, "Finally in the Directors Chair" Forlime 150:7 (4 October 2004) 42. 
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I I I . DIVERSITY ADVOCACY: T H E ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE RATIONALE 
The starthng statistics and troubhng experiences outhned above 
have not gone unnoticed. Canadian civil society organizations and other 
commentators advocating in favour of board diversification have recently 
sought to buttress their arguments by casting the issue in terms of 
organizational performance. In other words, they advance the view that 
diversity should be at the top of the corporate agenda because a more 
heterogeneous board will invariably lead to a more profitable, value-
generating business (for example, through better governance).'"^ In some 
instances, we are encouraged to look beyond traditional considerations of 
racial/gender justice and to the realm of competitive advantage.'"' These 
economic arguments, however, have been vehemently contested by 
See, for example. Conference Board of Canada, "Women on Boards: Not Just the 
Right Thing...But the Bright Thing" (2002) at 13 ("[t]he business case for women on 
boards is significantly bolstered by this conclusion: the factors that appear to be 
influenced by more women on boards are precisely those that have the most impact on 
corporate results") [Conference Board of Canada, "Women on Boards"] and Carol 
Stephenson, "Leveraging Diversity to Maximum Advantage: the Business Case for 
Appointing More Women to Boards" (2004) 69 Ivey Bus. J. I . at 5 ("[t]here is a powerful 
business case for why corporate boards should bring more women around the board 
table.. .companies with female board members can expect significantly higher returns and 
better overall financial performance"). With respect to senior management/executives 
etc., see Conference Board of Canada, "Creating High-Performance Organizations: 
Leveraging Women's Leadership" (2000) at 24 ("[fjor those organizations that foster 
gender diversity at all levels of the organization, the rewards are great - bottom-line 
results, lower turnover and employment branding") and Catalyst, "Survey Findings", 
stip7-a note X at 4 ("[b]y pursuing a set of key "action steps," companies and firms can 
proactively tap into the competitive advantage offered by Canada's changing labour force 
-key to a productive, profitable, and sustainable organization") [emphasis added]. 
'"^ Wendy Cukier/The Diversity Institute, "Diversity - The Competitve Edge: 
Implications for the ICT Labour Markef (March 2007) at 4 ("[l]everaging diversity can 
offer a competitive edge.. .the payoff can be significant. Effectively addressing diversity 
is no longer just a matter of human rights or equity, it is a competitive necessity") (in the 
context of the ICT labour market; dealing with organizational diversity generally, rather 
than the board in particular). 
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corporate law scholars such as Douglas Branson, who insists that no 
positive correlation exists.'"^ What then is the empirical reality? 
A . E X A M I N I N G T H E E M P I R I C A L L I T E R A T U R E 
At a conceptual level, key aspects of the market-based rationale for 
enhanced board heterogeneity can be rooted in the organizational 
behaviour and economic theories of agency, transaction costs and resource 
dependence and have been summarized as follows: 
( 1 ) diversity improves the ability of the board to monitor 
managers due to increased independence, (2) diversity 
improves the decision making of the board due to unique 
new perspectives, increased creativity, and nontraditional 
innovative approaches, (3) diversity improves the 
information provided by the board to managers due to the 
unique information held by diverse directors, (4) diverse 
directors provide access to important constituencies and 
resources in the external environment, (5) board diversity 
sends important positive signals to the labor market, 
product market, and financial market, and (6) board 
diversity provides legitimacy to the corporation with both 
extemal and internal constituencies.'"' 
Douglas M. Branson, No Seat at the Table: How Corporate Governance and Law 
Keep Women Out of the Boardroom (New York: New York University Press, 2007) at 
176 ("[m]ost knowledgeable scholars, those who do business and corporate finance rather 
than race and gender subjects, deny...that any correlation exists...empirical work on the 
subject conclusively finds that no correlation can be found") (citation omitted). It should 
be noted that Branson further contents that this discussion is misleading since the board's 
most important function is monitoring, not wealth generation. Ibid. For various critiques 
of Professor Branson's text, see Sarah White & Joan MacLeod Heminway, "WANTED: 
Female Corporate Directors (A Review of Professor Douglas M . Branson's No Seat at 
the Table)" forthcoming in (2008) Pace L. Rev., online: SSRN 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=1295366>. 
David A. Carter et al., "The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance" (15 March 2007) at 7, online: SSRN 
<http://ssi-n.com/abstract=972763> [Carter, "The Diversity of Corporate Board 
Committees"]. 
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By way of practical illustration, the literature indicates not only that the 
board meeting attendance records of women are higher than their male 
counterparts,"" but also that a more gender diverse board actually 
increases the attendance of male directors.'" Given that meetings are one 
of the primary avenues through which directors fulf i l their responsibihties, 
it is believed that boards with higher attendance levels are better 
governed."^ 
But do the elements of good governance that accompany 
heterogeneity inform the goal of value generation? Empirical studies have 
explored this question and established a positive relationship between 
board diversity and firm financial performance. For example, with respect 
to gender, examinations of Fortune 500 companies have concluded that: 
(1) corporations with higher share retum volatility tend to consist of fewer 
female directors;"^ (2) higher levels of gender representation on boards 
translates into a consequential positive coixelation with Tobin's Q;"'' and 
(3) higher levels of gender representation in top management teams are 
positively correlated with share appraisal and corporate performance."^ 
Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, "Gender Diversity in the Boardroom" (March 
2007) at 18, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=594506> [Adams, "Gender 
Diversity"]. 
Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, "Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance" (May 2008) at 14, online: SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 107721 [Adams, "Women in the Boardroom"]. 
'''ibid at 10. 
Adams, "Gender Diversity", supra note X at 2. 
'Ibid, at 10. Tobin's Q is a measure of financial performance commonly used in 
corporate governance research that "compares the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of the firm's assets." See Christopher C. Nicholls, Coiporate Finance 
and Canadian Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000) at 88. In other words, i f a business's 
value exceeds the costs that would be required to reconstruct it, then surplus profits are 
being generated. 
Anthony F. Jurkus, Jung Chul Park & Lorraine S. Woodard, "Gender Diversity, Finn 
Performance, and Environment" (28 Febniary 2008), online: SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/ab.stract=1085109> (finding, however, that "the positive impact of 
gender diversity is only pronounced for women-exclusive environments where the 
benefits of diversity may be more in demand"). See ibid, at 2. 
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With respect to race, a recent study of particular Fortune 1,000 
firms, coupled with some of the U.S.'s largest private companies, found 
that higher degrees of racial diversity amongst corporate leaders were 
"significantly related to revenues, net income, and book-to-market 
equity"."^ In particular, the authors concluded that an inverse relationship 
exists between financial realization and enhanced racial diversity at the 
highest ranks of management up to a certain level. Beyond this, however, 
the two become positively correlated. These results suggest that firms 
which pursue racialized leaders only at a level of tokenism will not yield 
pecuniary gain. The value added by these individuals is not realized until 
a critical mass is reached."' At this stage, their unique views/abilities 
may become more entrenched in the organization's deliberative processes 
- for example, as the individuals become more socially integrated and are 
thus increasingly relied upon."^ In addition to gaining access to a more 
extended set of networks/stakeholders, the firm may then benefit from the 
wider array of outlooks and experiences that these individuals bring to the 
table, which can "enhance strategic problem-solving and decision-making 
capabilities.""' 
Quientta M. Robertson & Hyeon Jeong Park, "Examining tiie Link Between Diversity 
and Firm Performance: The Effects of Diversity Reputation and Leader Racial Diversity" 
(2007) 32:5 Group & Organization Management 548 at 560 [Robertson, "Examining the 
Link"]. 
The necessity of establishing a critical mass of diverse directors in order to reap the 
benefits of their diversity is a consistent theme in the literature. See, for example, Lynne 
L. Dallas, "The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors" 
(2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1363 at 1394 (citations omitted) [Dallas, "The New 
Managerialism"]; Vicki W. ICramer, Alison M. Konrad & Sumra Erkut, "Critical Mass 
on Corporate Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance" (Wellesley 
Centers for Women, Report No. WCW 11, 2006) at v ("The magic seems to occur when 
three or more women sei-ve on a board together") [I<j-amer, "Critical Mass"] and Monique 
Lortie-Lussier & Natalie Rinfret, "The Proportion of Women Managers: Where Is the 
Critical Mass?" (2002) 32:2 Journal of Apphed Social Psychology 1974. 
"** Robertson, "Examining the Link", supra note X at 563 - 564. 
Ibid, at 564. See also Dallas, "The New Managerialism", supra note X at 1391 
(sui-veying upper-echelon theoiy and related literature; observing that "group studies find 
that heterogeneous groups tend to make higher quality decisions in matters involving 
creative and judgmental decision making...heterogeneous groups share conflicting 
opinions, knowledge, and perspectives that result in a more thorough consideration of a 
wide range of interpretations, alternatives, and consequences") (citations omitted). 
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Thus, estabhshing a level of "cognitive diversity" in the 
boardroom is a key strategic asset, which serves to assist the firm in 
averting the perils/docile conduct associated with groupthink.'^' In 
Professors Leblanc and Gillies' classification scheme of director types, 
individuals exhibiting this characteristic are known as "challengers". 
They are viewed as "flinctional" directors who are inquisitive and cause 
others to reconsider determinations. They are to be contrasted with 
"conformists" - equilibrium preservers who do not seriously engage with 
issues and are viewed as "dysfunctional" d i r e c t o r s . T h e following 
observations from a study of Fortune 1,000 firms are instructive: 
Thirty-one of the 37 women directors interviewed...noted, 
without prompting, that women raise tough issues in the 
boardroom...A male C E O claimed the men "felt a gender 
obligation to behave as though they understood 
everything." As a woman director said, "Women are not 
afraid that they will look dumb if they ask a question," and 
their "willingness to ask the question helps the board 
process. I f people are afraid to raise a question, a matter 
does not get resolved.'^'' 
It should be noted that cognitive diversity, and the accompanying element 
of constructive dissent which questions the dominant logic, are key to 
making the case that board diversity correlates to increased independence, 
which may then foster value enhancement. Indeed, board independence in 
and of itself (i.e. simply having non-officers/employees without the 
plurality of perspectives associated with gender and racial variety) is 
Robertson, "Examining tlie Link", ibid, at 553. 
Nanette Fondas & Susan Sassalos, "A Different Voice in tlie Boardroom: How the 
Presence of Women Directors Affects Board Influence Over Management" (2000) 12 
Global Focus 13 at 20; Steven .A.. Ramirez, "A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can 
Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Coiporate Cormption?" (2003) 77 St. John's L. Rev. 
837 at 839ff 
Richard Leblanc &, James Gillies, Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work 
and the Coming Revohihon in Corporate Governance (Mississauga; Wiley, 2005) at X. 
ICi-amer, "Critical Mass", supra note X at 14. 
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arguably insufficient to enhance firm performance and to provide 
effective monitoring. 
While various other studies have established a correlation between 
board diversity and profitability,'^^ authors have often conceded that this 
See Sanjai Bhagat & Bemard Black, "The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance" (2002) 27 J. Corp. L. 231 at 248 
("[t]he results...offer no evidence that firms with more independent boards perfonn 
better. They provide evidence instead that firms with more independent boards do not 
perform better, and hints that these firms suffer worse performance than other firms") and 
Edward Waitzer, "Real Independence" Financial Post (28 Febmary 2008), online: 
Financial Post Comment <http://www.financialpost.com/storv.html?id=339212%20> 
("there is substantial empirical research questioning the correlation between 
independence and coiporate performance"). 
Erica Beecher-Monas, "Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: Just 
How Far Have You Come, Baby?" (2007) 86 Oregon L. Rev. 373 at 376 
("[ijndependence defined as an absence of conflicting interests does not go far enough. 
Because directors fimction as a small social network, the dynamics of group decision 
making mean that boards need independent thought. Nourishing a culture of dissent will 
go farther in promoting the kind of monitoring that corporate govemance is supposed to 
achieve") [Beecher-Monas, "MaiTying Diversity"]. 
'^ ^ For a sample of additional U.S. literature, see: David A Carter, Betty Simkins & W. 
Gary Simpson, "Corporate Govemance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value" (2003) 38 
Financial Review 33 at 51 ("After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate 
governance measures, we find statistically significant relationships between the presence 
of women or minorities on the board and fimi value, as measured by Tobin's Q") [Carter, 
"Corporate Governance"]; Niclas L. Erhardt, James D. Werbel & Charles B. Shrader, 
"Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance" (2003) I I Corporate 
Govemance: An International Review 102 at 107 ("The results of this study supported the 
original hypothesis stating that relatively higher levels of board diversity would lead to 
higher organisational performance" (using return on equity and return on assets as 
performance measures); Catalyst, "The Bottom Line: Coiporate Performance and 
Women's Representation on Boards" (2007) (using retum on equity, return on sales and 
return on invested capital as performance measures); Roy D. Adler, "Women in the 
Executive Suite CoiTelate to High Profits" (2001), online: Glass Ceiling Research Center 
http://elassceiling.org/InTheNewsFolder/HBRAi-ticiePrintablePage.html: Stanely Slater, 
Robert Weigand & Thomas Zwirlein, "The Business Case for Commitment to Diversity" 
(2008) 51 Business Horizons 201 at 203 (citing C. Dalton & D. Dalton, "In Defense of 
the Individual: The CEO As Board Chairperson" (2005) 26:6 Journal of Business 
Strategy 8). For the U.K. experience, see for example, Val Singh, "Ethnic Diversity on 
Top Corporate Boards: A Resource Dependency Perspective" (2007) 18:12 The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management 2128 at 2128 ("The 20 [FTSE 
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does not necessarily imply causation. So then, although one 
interpretation of the data is that corporate leadership diversity is value-
enhancing, is it not equally possible that firms which are profitable for 
other, independent reasons simply possess the resources that allow them to 
pursue diversity-related initiatives?'^^ 
While the literature is still in its infancy, recent explorations of this 
question using Tobin's Q as a performance measure suggest that causation 
can, in fact, be empirically established.'^' While at first instance this may 
be cause for celebration amongst diversity advocates, the reality is not 
quite so simple and is context dependent. For example, a deeper 
unpacking of the data suggests that particular board fiinctions/committee 
work appear to be emiched by diversity while others are not. Further, 
while racial and gender variance seem to exhibit the same positive 
influence on financial outcomes, this is not uniformly so.'^ " Certain 
literature also suggests that the effects of diversity on financial realization 
100] companies with [ethnic minority] directors are significantly more likely than other 
boards to have higher market capitalization"). 
™ See, for example, "Women and Profits" Hai-vard Business Review 79:10 (November 
2001) at 30 ("[The study] found a strong correlation between a company's profits and the 
number of female senior executives in its ranks...[w]hile...correlation does not prove 
causality...business leaders would be wise to keep these findings in mind..."); 
Conference Board of Canada, "Women on Boards", supra note X at 12 ("These 
correlations do not necessarily show causality...Clearly, more research is needed in the 
area of cause and effect, particularly in gauging how women affect organizational 
outcomes and results"); Catalyst, ibid, at n. 2 ("[c]orrelation does not prove or imply 
causation"); Adler, ibid, at 2 ("[i]t is important to note that the con-elation does not prove 
causality"). 
'^ ^ Carter, "The Diversity of Coiporate Board Committees", supra note X at 5. With 
respect to racialized directors, this issue is further compHcated by the fact that the lack of 
these individuals necessarily means fewer data samples. Ibid, at 5 - 6. 
Ibid, at 26 ("Our data also indicate that the direction of causation goes from board 
diversity to firm financial perfomiance which supports the economic case for board 
diversity. When we consider the percentage of women and ethnic minority directors on 
the board, the diversity of board composition appears to create value for shareholders.") 
This study involved a suiYey of the Fortune 500 over a 5 year period. 
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may, in fact, be neutral'^' or tliat any added value is a function of 
establishing the right diversity mix/balance (as opposed to merely ensuring 
the presence of diverse individuals).'^^ Additionally, studies indicate that 
the relationship between diversity and pecuniary advantage may be linked 
to a firm's overall investor culture. Consonant with the apprehension that 
overmonitoring may have the effect of value minimization, companies 
with insubstantial shareholder voice (i.e. requiring fiirther monitoring) 
appear to derive benefit, while those with stronger voice sustain adverse 
repercussions.'•'•' Finally, proper diversity management appears to be a 
key determinant of whether diversity-related financial value will be 
adequately hamassed by firms.'^'* 
In considering the literature referenced above, I would disagree 
with Professor Branson's overly austere characterization of the evidence. 
There is certainly potential to ground a case for leadership diversity in 
economic rationales. However, this line of argument is certainly quite 
nuanced. It carries with it various complications and is by no means 
infahible. 
At this stage, it is important to consider the issue in light of the 
identity narratives explored in part I I above. To the extent that the 
economic argument for diversity can be substantiated, it appears that 
critical mass, combined with the unique views/abilities/ cognitive diversity 
brought to the boardroom by diverse corporate leaders, are essential 
components. How does this resonate with the lived experiences of 
Kathleen A. Farrell & Philip L. Hersch, "Additions to Coiporate Boards: the Effect of 
Gender" (2005) 11 J. of Corp. Finance 85 at 86 ("[i]n general, our results tend to suggest 
that adding women to the board does not result in value creation (or destruction)"). 
'^ ^ Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, "Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and 
Firm Financial Performance" (2008) 83 J. of Business Ethics 435 at 447. 
Adams, "Women in the Boardroom", supra note X at 5 (using Tobin's Q and return on 
assets as performance measures). 
Orlando C. Richard, "Racial Diversity, Business Strategy, and Firm Perfomance: A 
Resource-Based View" (2000) 43:2 The Academy of Management Journal 164 at 174; 
Steven A, Ramirez, "Diversity and the Boardroom" (2000) 6 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 85 at 
109; Jeffrey Gandz, "A Business Case for Diversity" (Queen's Printer of Ontario, 2001) 
at 16 ("[a]chieving diversity does nothing for an organization unless that diversity is 
managed effectively"). 
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Canadian firm members? In considering the anecdotal evidence of the 
inability of these individuals to establish an adequate workplace fit 
because of their racial/gender minority status, their pressure to conform to 
the dominant group's conception of "Canadian identity", their social 
isolation and the silencing of their dissent etc., it is certainly arguable that 
Canadian firms are cultivating corporate environments that actively stifle 
the factors which might otherwise enable them to successfully leverage 
diversity. As posited by Professor Beecher-Monas, "[n]either race nor 
gender are necessarily a proxy for diversity of viewpoint. Having women 
and minorities on the board who mimic white male traits and attitudes will 
do little to achieve diversity." '^ ^ 
B . A N O T E OF C A U T I O N 
The economic argument is certainly attractive insofar as it carries 
persuasive cun-ency as a political strategy. It is not outlandish to say that 
corporate Canada, to date, has been unmoved by concems of gender and 
racial equality and that appeals predicated on value enhancement may hold 
more sway.'^ ^ With respect to race, this approach can be seen as standing 
in harmony with "interest convergence theory", which posits that 
meaningfial reform wiU only occur "when the interests of the racially 
oppressed align with the interests of the people who have the power to 
Beecher-Monas, "Marrying Diversity", supra note X at 405. 
'•'^  In the U.S. context, see Carter, "The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees", 
supra note X at 5 ("The validity of the noi-mative case for board diversity is not 
dependent on the economic case but certainly it would be very attractive from various 
perspectives i f including qualified women and minorities on the board because it is the 
right thing to do resuhed in value creation for shareholders"). See also Carter, 
"Coiporate Governance", supra note X at 34 ("participants at a foram sponsored by the 
Conference Board "immediately rejected the notion that board diversity for its own sake, 
without a business case, was sufficient reason to act"") (citation omitted) and Leonard M. 
Baynes, "Foreword: The Intersection of Race, Coiporate Law, and Economic 
Development" (2003) 77 St. John's L. Rev. 701 at 708 (noting that strategies predicated 
on business law tools and economic development "may in fact be more efficacious than 
the traditional civil rights remedies") (citation omitted). 
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bring about reform." In the context of corporate govemance, Professor 
Ramirez argues that those seeking race-based reform must embrace the 
favourable openings that exist in political capitalism and coordinate their 
agendas with the agendas of those that exercise commercial/political 
dominion. 
That being said, I must also register a degree of hesitation. One 
must tread careflilly and remain mindfiil of the critiques of this approach. 
In the context of feminist theory, Professor Testy invokes Audre Lorde's 
oft-quoted piece "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's 
House" in cautioning against a reconstmctive project that ends up 
devitalized and impoverished on account of internalizing the tenants and 
objectives of the dominant paradigms that are being impugned.'^' 
Elaborating on this in the context of race. Professor Joo cautions 
that linking diversity with shareholder wealth serves to make what are 
fimdamentally arguments of racial justice more palatable, more justifiable, 
more "race-neutraf. The inherent import of racial equality may become 
stunted in its development i f it is allowed to be appropriated - to be 
subject to acquisition, i f you will - by the predominant discourse of profit 
maximization.'''" While we are able to sidestep a potentially controversial 
unpacking of corporate racism and stmctural inequality, "there is danger in 
founding a racial agenda on nonracial values".''" The fact that racial 
justice is a desirable, independent goal has the potential to become lost in 
the mix as we debate the nexus between equal representation and profit. 
Steven A. Ramirez, "Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theoiy; Why 
Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It" (2004) 61 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1583 at 1585 (citations omitted). 
'•^^ Ibid, at 1606 (citations omitted). Professor Ramirez writes: "[w]hile one may bemoan 
the cun-ent distribution of political and economic power, there is little to be gained from 
dwelling on this point.. .A more effective approach is to take the current distribution of 
economic and political power as a given and find a way to operate within those 
constraints." Ibid. 
Kellye Y. Testy, "Linking Progressive Coiporate Law with Progressive Social 
Movements" (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 at 1229 - 1230. 
""^  Thomas W. Joo, "Race, Coiporate Law, and Shareholder Value" (2004) 54 J. Legal 
Educ. 351 at 352 [Joo, "Race, Coiporate Law"]. 
Ibid, at 363. 
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There is an important moral imperative at play - certain values are 
fundamental in and of themselves and should not be abrogated.''*^ But by 
validating diversification initiatives with reference to wealth aggregation, 
the implication is that the worth of these efforts is contingent on stock 
value.'''^ As poignantly asked by Professor Wilkins, writing in the context 
of equal representation in corporate law firms: "what caused the rhetoric 
of the black equality struggle to shift from one grounded on moral claims 
about integration being "the right thing to do" to economic arguments 
premised on the claim that "diversity is good for business"?"''*'' Further, 
implicit in economic optimization arguments is an acceptance of morally 
questionable racial commodification, where an individual's racialized 
status is cast as a "commodity to be bought and sold in the 
marketplace".'''^ 
Beyond the philosophical difficulties associated with purely 
instrumental rationales, there are also more tangible social and personal 
repercussions that require consideration by Canadian diversity advocates 
as they fiirther refine their strategies. Consider, for example, the argument 
that the appointment of diverse directors will assist the corporation in 
connecting with a more extended and diverse circle of 
constituencies/clients and thus augment earnings.'''^  As noted by 
' ' See Lisa M . Fairfax, "Clogs in the Pipehne: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and 
Continued Barriers to Their Advancements" (2006) 65 Md. L. Rev. 579 at 595 ("ensuring 
a more representative number of women directors in the boardroom has an important 
moral significance. At base, having a boardroom that better reflects women's 
participation in the workforce is the right thing to do"). 
'••^  Thomas W. Joo, "Coiporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice" (2005) 79 St. John's L. 
Rev. 955 at 970 (citation omitted) [Joo, "Corporate Hierarchy"]. 
David B. Wilkins, "From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for 
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black 
Corporate Bar" (2004) 117 Hai-vard L. Rev. 1548 at 1553 [Wilkins, "Separate is 
Inherently Unequal"]. 
Lisa M. Fairfax, "The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: .A. Cost-Benefit .Analysis of 
the Business Rationales for Diversity on Coiporate Boards" (2005) Wis. L. Rev. 795 at 
847 (citation omitted) [Fairfax, "The Bottom Line"]. 
See, for example. Catalyst, "Advancing African-American Women in the Workplace: 
What Managers Need to ICnow" (2004) at 2 (noting significant increases in Black buying 
power in the U.S.) (citation omitted) and Steven A. Ramirez, "Diversity and the 
Boardroom" (2000) 6 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 85 at 100 - 101 ("[o]ne area where this 
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Professor Fairfax, to ttie extent tliis assertion relies on the idea that 
raciahzed directors are better able to identify with/understand the needs of 
racialized extemal stakeholders (e.g. consumers), it may be fallacious 
when considering possible class differentials between these groups. 
Further, the corollary of the argument is the firm should actively employ 
the skills of racialized directors in developing consumer/client-bases that 
are from the directors' own ethno-cultural group. This may lead to the 
"pigeon-holing" of diverse directors, which would prevent them from 
being active participants in matters of wider concem to the board and from 
contributing the breadth of their skills/abilities. This would effectively 
serve to further disempower and marginalize the director''*^ - an 
unfortunate reality that has been reported in corporate law firms. 
Finally, at a general level, an over-reliance on economic rationales as a 
means of addressing complexities in business culture may have 
problematic consequences for the practice of theorizing the firm, forcing a 
sort of conceptual stagnation that does not allow for growth and 
development.'^" 
value is unleashed is the ability to exploit diversity to achieve greater market 
penetration...the insights and sensitivities brought by people from varying ethnic 
backgrounds help companies reach a wider variety of markets") (citations omitted). For a 
discussion of board diversity in the context of corporate relations with consumers, and 
through the lens of signalling theoiy, see Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
"SignaUng Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?" forthcoming in (2008) 76 U. 
Cinn. L. Rev., online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 132884> at 28 - 29. 
Fairfax, "The Bottom Line", supra note X at 842. 
'''ibid, at 844-845. 
" ' See Wilkins, "Separate is Inherently Unequal", supra note X at 1595 - 1597 
(discussing the experiences of Puerto Rican, Japanese-American and Black lawyers; 
noting that being racially pigeon-holed leaves the individual feeling "devalued and 
exploited"). 
See Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh, "Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking 
Social Initiatives by Business" (2003) 48 Administrative Science Quarterly 268 at 280: 
A preoccupation with instrumental consequences renders a theoiy that 
accommodates economic premises yet sidesteps the underlying tensions 
between the social and economic imperatives that confront 
organizations. Such a theoiy risks omitting the pressing descriptive and 
normative questions raised by these tensions, which, when explored, 
might hold great promise for new theory, and even for addressing 
practical management challenges. How do firms navigate their way 
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In light of these considerations, diversity proponents should 
proceed with caution and resist the temptation to let market-based 
rationales become the entire focus of their advocacy. 
I V . MECHANISMS F O R R E F O R M 
It has been observed that according to traditional economic theory, 
the market will eventually eradicate employment bias'^' given its inherent 
lack of efficiency and rationality.'^^ Thus far, this proposition has not 
borne fruit at the highest levels of the Canadian corporation. 
Correspondingly, this section considers mechanisms for reform at both the 
exfra-legal and legal levels. 
A . E X T R A - L E G A L 
Steps towards ameliorating the issues raised in this paper will 
undoubtedly involve implementing changes in organizational culture. 
There are myriad ways to move forward on this front including, for 
example, establishing "apprenticeship or understudy programs",'^'' 
creating board committees specifically designed to address gender and 
through these tensions? How ought they to do so? Organizational 
inquiiy must go beyond efforts to reconcile corporate responses to 
social misery with the neoclassical model of the firm. Rather, this 
social and economic tension should serve as a starting point for new 
theoiy and research. 
Charles D. Watts, Jr., "In Critique of a Reductivist Conception and Examination of 
"The Just Organization"" (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1515 at 1519 (citation 
omitted). 
Katherine V.W. Stone, "The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law" (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519 at 
599. 
'^ ^ Sarra, "Class Act", supra note X at 1136. 
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race issues and establishing haisons with organizations that can provide 
a roster of qualified diverse candidates. 
Two of the most salient extra-legal avenues for reform include 
enhanced networking and mentoring opportunities. With respect to the 
former, a survey of women sitting on Canadian boards indicates that the 
most important aspect of attaining a directorship is "being visible to male 
CEOs, male board chairmen and male board members"'^ ^ given that the 
""old boy's network" is still alive and well."'^' These perceptions fit into 
the overall context of Financial Post 500 corporations consistently 
selecting directors from restricted pools - such as candidates who already 
have one or more directorships with other Financial Post 500 firms. 
Correspondingly, while executive search agencies are increasingly 
employed for director recruitment, for the most part these processes 
continue to be conducted informally - especially given that recruitment 
firms tend to make use of intemal networks in determining suitable 
applicants.'^' This is problematic from a diversity perspective, as access 
to integral professional and social networks is significantly thwarted by 
An example in the U.S. is the Director Diversity Initiative, run by the University of 
North Carolina's law faculty. See "Director Diversity Initiative", online: UNC School of 
Law 
<https://ddi.law.unc.edu/defauh.aspx> ("[t]he Initiative also maintains a computerized 
database of potential diverse directors"). In Canada, Maytree's DiverseCity onBoard 
program connects qualified raciahzed candidates with non-profit/public boards. See 
"DiverseCity onboard", online: 
<http://mvw.diversecitvtoronto.ca/diversecitv-onboard/>. Also, the publication "Women 
in the Lead" is a "directory of more than 600 women whose professional expeilise and 
experience recommend them as candidates for corporate board appointment." See "The 
Directory", onhne: Women in the Lead <http://www.womeninthelead.ca/directorv.htm>. 
Ronald J. Burke, "Women Directors: Selection, Acceptance and Benefits of Board 
Membership" (1997) 5:3 Coiporate Governance: An International Review 118 at 123. 
'"/Wo', at 124. 
Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census", supra note X at 3. 
Ibid, at 24. As one female director put it: "Now all of the search committees, the 
governance committees, they go through the exercise of hiring firms...[However,] the 
lion's share of directors still come through the internal networks of the people involved." 
Ibid 
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gendered barriers. Indeed, existing Canadian female directors have 
indicated that the networks they were able to utilize "are rarely available 
to women" and that "many qualified women may not even be aware that 
such entry portals exisf In that regard. Catalyst urges firms to 
critically consider the possible exclusionary effects of informal 
networking practices and to establish formal networking structures that, by 
design, focus on inclusion.'^' 
With respect to the latter, establishing a professional culture of 
mentoring is essential. The research indicates that racialized persons who 
progress to the highest ranks of the corporate hierarchy, without exception, 
enjoy the benefits of mentoring relationships."'^ This, however, is not an 
easy task as the lack of representation at the top makes it very difficult to 
establish the specific types of mentoring relationships that are necessary.'^ ^ 
In other words, studies establish that cross-race and cross-gender 
mentoring relationships suffer key shortcomings from the perspective of 
the mentee." '^' On this issue. Catalyst recommends establishing formal 
Ibid, at 26. The observations of female directors surveyed on this point include the 
following: "[t]he biggest impediment to women being on boards is that they are not part 
of the network, and the network, what used to be called the "old boys' club," is there. It's 
alive, it's well, and it is flilly functioning", "[ojften board directorships come through 
networking, and women are often less well exposed within the network.. .There are fewer 
women within the network and.. .the networks aren't as wide or as pervasive." Ibid. 
Catalyst, "Career Advancement in Coiporate Canada: A Focus on Visible Minorities -
Critical Relationships" (2007) at 26 - 27 [Catalyst, "Critical Relationships"]. 
David A. Thomas, "The Tmth About Mentoring Minorities: Race Matters" (2001) 79 
Harvard Business Review 98 at 99 [Thomas, "The Trath"]. For further discussion of the 
value of mentoring relationships in attaining corporate directorships, see Susan 
Vinnicombe & Val Singh, "Locks and Keys to the Boardroom" (2003) 18:6 Women in 
Management Review 325 at 332. 
"'^  See Keith L. Alexander, "Minority Women Feel Racism, Sexism are Blocking the 
Path to Management" Wall Street Journal (25 July 2007) at B l ("The dearth of top black 
managers - let alone female black managers - makes it nearly impossible to fmd a savvy 
ally who has both faced the same difficulties and blazed a trail") 
See, for example, David A. Thomas, "The Impact of Race on Managers' Experiences 
of Developmental Relationships (Mentoring and Sponsorship): An Intra-Organizational 
Study" (1990) I I Journal of Organizational Behaviour 479 at 487 ("[i]t was found that 
same-race relationships do provide more psychosocial support than do cross-race 
relationships...[and] [s]ame-sex relationships provide more psychosocial [and career] 
support than do cross-sex relationships") and Thomas, "The Trath", supra note X at 105 
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mentoring structures, enhancing "strategic mentoring" capacities and 
prioritizing mentee exposure to the diverse colleagues that do exist at more 
senior levels. 
B . LEGAL CULTURE AND PRACTICE 
It is arguable that the legal culture and practice that shape 
corporate activity may ultimately serve to facilitate board homogeneity 
and to undermine future diversification efforts. This is most pronounced 
when considering the director nomination process,'^ '' shareholder 
proposals and existing corporate govemance principles. 
1. DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 
In theory, shareholders' power to elect corporate directors is one of 
the most important rights associated with equity investment. In practice, 
however, this power is largely illusory.'^' In Canada, as with the U.S., the 
process of electing public company directors does not afford shareholders 
an opportunity to select from rival candidates. Rather, in advance of a 
meeting, shareholders are provided with a proxy circular that contains a 
"management slate" - a list of possible directors approved of and put forth 
by the cuiTcnt directors of the corporation (i.e. via the nomination or board 
("when the mentoring relationship is across race, the mentor will often have certain 
limitations as a role model...In my study, an African- American paiticipant recounted 
how his white mentor encouraged him to adopt the mentor's more aggressive style. But 
when the protege did so, others labeled him an "angiy black man""). 
Catalyst, "Critical Relationships", supra note X at 28 - 29. 
'^ ^ Burke, "Women on Corporate Boards", supra note X at 4 ("[t]he director selection and 
nomination process has been identified as one barrier to the appointment of women to 
coiporate boards"). 
"[SJhareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic sense elect boards. 
Rather, boards elect themselves." M . Blair & L. Stout, "A Team Production Theoiy of 
Corporate Law" (1999) 85. Va . L. Rev. 247 at 311 [emphasis in original]. For a 
discussion of shareholder impotence in terms of the right to appoint the firm's auditor, 
see Anita Indira Anand, "Shareholder Isolation and the Regulation of Auditors" (2004) 
54 U. Toronto L.J. 1. 
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selection committee). Under the traditional voting standard of plurality, 
shareholders are asked either to support these individuals or to withhold 
support - not to vote against. Correspondingly, a candidate will be 
elected i f he/she secures a plurality of votes, irrespective of the number of 
votes that withhold support and even i f the plurality does not reflect a 
majority of votes submitted.'^' The result has been characterized as 
"'Soviet-style' elections" and "a ceremony that masks the self-
perpetuating and insular nature of many boards".'"' 
After considerable debate in the U.S., the Canadian Coalition for 
Good Govemance ("CCGG") recently began a campaign to shift from a 
plurality system to a majority system. Under it, boards establish intemal 
policies stipulating that candidates in respect of whom a majority of votes 
are withheld must submit their resignation to the company (under the 
principle that votes withheld are to be constmed as votes against)."' I see 
this as a significant step in the right direction and it should be noted that as 
of December 2008 at least 99 Canadian tmsts and corporations have 
172 
implemented majority voting procedures. 
That being said, the CCGG initiative is by no means a panacea. It 
contemplates the board retaining discretion as to whether or not to actually 
accept the unsuccessful candidate's resignation. The board is not required 
to do so."^ Further, majority voting is "much less threatening to corporate 
'^ ^ Christopher C. Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomeiy, 2005) at 234 
- 235 [Nicholls, "Corporate Law"]; Carol Hansell, What Directors Need To Know: 
Corporate Governance (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 38 - 39. 
"'^  Lisa M. Fairfax, "Shareholder Democracy on Trial: Some Intemational Perspective on 
the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power" (2008) 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 1 at 5. 
™ J. Cook, "Director Elections: Impact of Regulatory Changes and Shareholder Activism 
on the Market for Corporate Leadership" (Presentation at the Workshop of the Chair in 
Business Law and International Trade, University of Montreal, 21 September 2006) at 3, 
online: http://w\vw,droitdesaffaires.org/pdf/icook.pdf [Cook, "Director Elections"]. 
CCGG, "Guidelines: Majority Voting", onhne CCGG: 
<http://\vww.ccgg.ca/guidelines/maioritv-voting/>. 
CCGG, "Majority Voting Adoptees", online CCGG: 
<http://www.ccgg.ca/guidelines/maiorits'-voting/maioritv-voting-adoptees/>. 
Various players in the Canadian investment community have criticized this style of 
approach. See, for example. Shareholder Association for Research and Education, "How 
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boards than contested elections" and it is quite arduous for shareholders 
to recommend their own competing candidates."^ While it is tme that the 
shareholder proposal mechanism under Canadian corporate law expressly 
permits shareholder-driven director nominations,"^ as will be discussed 
below, this mechanism is fraught with difficulties that thwart investor 
voice. In effect, equity holders must be willing to take on the role of 
"dissident shareholder" and to finance a very costly and time-consuming 
proxy contest, wherein they would circulate a dissident circular and 
attempt to convince other shareholders to support their dissent slate (as 
opposed to the management slate). As a result, shareholder-led director-
replacement initiatives are "extremely rare""' and "rarely a feasible 
option for small shareholders.""^ 
These problems are compounded by other defects in the 
shareholder voting stmcture. Former Ontario Securities Commission 
Chair Edward Waitzer recently commented on an unintended effect of 
National Instmment 54-101, which addresses a corporation's 
communications with beneficial owners."' He notes the instmment does 
the Votes Added up at Canada's Big Banks", online: SHARE 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1435&print> ("Why should a director who does not enjoy 
the confidence of shareholders continue to serve? We cannot think of a compelling 
reason"). 
Cook, "Director Elections", supra note X at 9. 
Nicholls, "Corporate Law", supra note X at 235. 
"' CBCA, supra note X, ss. 137(4). 
RiskMetrics Group, "Ethical Funds (Canada)", online: 
<www.riskmetrics.com/policy_exchange/policv_detail7param l=ef&param2=boai-d&para 
m3=proxv access> ["RiskMetrics"]. 
Christopher C. Nicholls, Mergers, Acquisitions and other Changes of Corporate 
Control (Toronto: Irwin, 2007) at 266. 
National Instruments are developed by provincial securities administrations in 
collaboration and are put forth by the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA"), the 
umbrella organization of all provincial regulators. The fact that an instrument has been 
termed "national", as opposed to "multilateral", reflects its adoption by the regulator of 
each province. See Mark R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 3d ed., (Toronto; 
Thomson, 2007) at 101 and Jeffrey G. Macintosh & Christopher C. Nicholls, Securihes 
Law (Toronto: Ii-win Law, 2002) at 83 - 84. 
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not explicitly speak to what party should sustain the costs of sending 
proxy materials to beneficial owners that are unwilling to disclose their 
identity to the reporting issuer. Leveraging the instrument's silence, 
issuers are progressively declining to pay. It is argued that regulatory 
attention to this defect may make it "easier for shareholders to veto the 
election of directors standing unopposed". 
In addition, the CSA has not advocated other U.S.-style actions 
that could produce the same result; for example, recent electronic proxy 
provisions which allow the utilization of internet-posted proxy 
materials.'^' This initiative has the potential to markedly decrease the 
significant expenses associated with initiating a proxy contest. 
Similarly, effective February 25, 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") took a bold step forward in facilitating internet-
based investor communication in the form of electronic shareholder 
forums. The SEC's amendments to its proxy rules eliminate any concems 
that partaking in such a form will trigger solicitation requirements 
(provided certain conditions are met) and make it clear that the operation 
of these fomms will not leave a firm or shareholder (or a third party acting 
on behalf of either) liable for statements made by other participants.'^^ 
Through the utilization of technology, these innovative amendments 
remove substantial legal and financial barriers to shareholder engagement 
and expressly contemplate bolstering investor participation in the director 
nomination process.'^  
Ed Waitzer, "Let Investors Do It" Financial Post (24 April 2008), online: Financial 
Post Comment 
<http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpconiment/archive/2008/04/24/let-investors-
do-it.aspx >. 
'''Ibicl. 
Cook, "Director Elections", supra note X at 5. 
"Electronic Shareholder Fomms", 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (25 Febmary 2008) at I , online: 
SEC 
<l)ttp://sec.gov/rules/fuial/2008/34-57172.pdf>. 
Ibid, at 27 ("we hope to tap the potential of technology to better vindicate 
shareholders' state law rights, including their rights to elect directors, in ways that are 
potentially both more effective and less expensive"). 
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These sorts of proactive movements would be important first steps 
in reconfiguring the Canadian landscape and should be seriously examined 
by regu la to rs .h i the interim, we are left with a troubling predicament. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, studies reveal that corporate leaders 
demonstrate an unconscious bias towards in-group favouritism. Imphcit 
social cognitions and lack of exposure to qualified female and racialized 
candidates may lead White, male directors to reproduce predominantly 
White, male boards. And yet there is little opportunity to inject a plurality 
of opinion into the director-nomination process - for example, by allowing 
shareholders to challenge the corporation's choice of directors. As a 
result, there is a continuing inertia towards self-perpetuation and a 
decreased probability of challenging the "behavioral bias toward 
homogeneity".'^^ 
Firms, inter alia, are apprehensive about such interventions for fear 
that their desired candidates would not gravitate to elections where they 
risk defeat.'^' But in some ways this is actually the point - i.e. to cause 
the corporation to rethink traditional modes of director selection, and to 
extend beyond typical pools of senior managers/executives and 
business/social contacts, in order to recognize the potential contributions 
of racialized and female candidates that are cuixently being overlooked.'^^ 
Claude Lamoureux & Edward Waitzer, "Shareholders Face Communications 
Breakdown" Financial Post (27 August 2008), online: Financial Post Comment 
<http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/archive/2008/08/27/shareholders-
face-communications-breakdown.aspx > ("The...need for leadership in Canada is 
immediate and imperative. The CSA should be proactive with initiatives to facilitate an 
increase in shareholder participation by taking advantage of technology to reduce the 
costs and other barriers to shareholder communications and ensure the integrity of the 
voting process. Failure to act wil l only serve to diminish public confidence in their 
ability..."). 
Joo, "A Trip", supra note X at 736. Professor Ray approaches the general issue from 
the perspective of democratic theory. See Dennis M. Ray, "Corporate Boards and 
Corporate Democracy" (2005) 20 J. of Corporate Citizenship 93 at 97 ("[s]elf-
perpetuating and self-serving corporate oligarchy...violates a basic premjse of democratic 
theoiy with regard to participation and representation"). 
™ Cook, "Director Elections", supra note X at 9. 
As I have stated earlier, the statistics do not support businesses' perception of a pool 
problem. In other words, diverse candidates with "traditional" qualifications exist (e.g. 
business expertise etc.). While the primary claim being made is that Canadian firms 
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This, of course, assumes that board homogeneity would be of concem to 
shareholders. It is arguable that this issue is progressively starting to 
appear on the shareholder radar. My analysis of data compiled by the 
Shareholder Association for Research and Education reveals that in the 
2008 proxy season shareholders submitted approximately 12 proposals to 
Canadian corporations/financial institutions seeking greater board 
representation; in particular, with respect to gender. One such proposal 
even gamered 11 percent of the votes cast, a significant result for a 
proposal that would traditionally be viewed as social policy-related in 
nahire.'^' 
As shareholder consciousness of the links between board diversity 
and enhanced corporate govemance and firm value increases, there is 
every reason to believe that these trends will continue and expand in their 
scope'''' and it is hoped that institutional investors will take a proactive 
should reach out to these individuals, I also support the argument that boards should seek 
candidates with "non-traditional" qualifications. See Curtis J. Crawford, "Be Strategic 
about Board Composition" (2008) I Board Composition 33 at 34 ("[gjreat directors are to 
be found not only in corporate settings, but also in govemment and in not-for-profit 
cultural and academic settings...boards should develop strategies for tapping into the 
eclectic pool of highly qualified candidates working in nontraditional settings"). 
Shareholder Association for Research and Education, "Shareholder Resolution 
Database", online: SHARE 
<http://share.ca/en/node/1341> (proposal to Power Corporation of Canada by 
Mouvement d'Education et de Defense des Actionnaires ). 
"° Consider, for example, the following position of the Ethical Funds Company: 
The Ethical Funds Company supports proposals to report on diversity 
in the workforce, and to adopt plans to improve diversity and equity in 
the workplace...[it] supports proposals to create and implement 
employment equity pohcies...The term "glass ceiling" refers to the 
barrier to the advancement of women and minorities into corporate 
management positions...among the 535 most senior and highest paid 
positions in Canadian companies, just 4.8% are held by women. The 
percentage of women on corporate boards in Canada is also similar to 
the situation in the United States, ranging from 9-12%...depending on 
the index analyzed. Management studies indicate that companies with 
high ratings for equal employment opportunity have perfomied better 
in the stock market than companies with poor performance in areas 
related to hiring and advancing women and minorities. The Ethical 
Funds Company supports proposals to report on steps taken to adopt 
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role in leading this charge''' as seen in the U.S."^ And yet, there are 
notable limits to shareholders' ability to submit proposals to 
management"^ and thus to proactively engage diversity-related issues. In 
general, the proposal mechanism affords shareholders the right to compel 
a vote on issues the proponent considers significant. The corporation is 
obligated to include a proposal in the management proxy circular."'' 
Shareholders then consider the proposal before voting on it at an annual 
meeting. The corporation, how e^ver, is excused from the duty to distribute 
a proposal i f certain procedural requirements are not met or i f a 
substantive basis for exclusion exists."^ This leads to the factors that 
quell investor voice alluded to above, four of which I will mention now. 
2. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS - LIMITATIONS 
First, in order to submit a proposal under the CBCA, shareholders 
must either own (or have the support of others who own) 1 percent of total 
outstanding voting shares on the date of submission or own shares that 
have a fair market value of at least $2,000 at the close of business on the 
policies addressing leadership development, employee mentoring, 
workforce diversity initiatives, and family-friendly programs. 
See RiskMetrics, supra note X at online: 
<http://www.riskmetrics.com/policv_exchange/poIicv_detail?paraml=ef&param2=esg& 
param3=equal>. 
Consistent with the view that these investors are/should be more concemed with long-
term value creation. 
For example, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement 
Equities Fund, one of the largest financial services firms in the U.S., has adopted a 
governance policy position which insists that boards "should be composed of "qualified 
individuals who reflect diversity of experience, gender, race, and age."" See Carter, 
"Corporate Governance", supra note X at 34 (citation omitted). 
See generally Aaron A. Dhir, "Realigning the Coiporate Building Blocks: Shareholder 
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights 
Accountability" (2006) 43:2 Am. Bus. L. J. 365 [Dhir, "Realigning"]. 
CBCA, supra note X, ss. 137(2). 
''^ Dhir, "ReaHgning", supra note X at 385 - 390. 
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day before submission. Of primary importance is the fact that this 
threshold requirement is raised in situations where the subject matter of 
the proposal is a director nomination. These proposals must be supported 
by an aggregate shareholding of, at minimum, 5 percent of shares or of 
shares of a class entitled to vote at the relevant meeting."' This is a key 
restriction and the rationales underlying it need to be reconsidered. 
Canadian equity holders have by no means demonstrated a history of 
abusing the proposal provision and it is difficult to see the necessity for 
these threshold requirements, which, by design, have the effect of 
excluding smaller investors."^ 
Second, the CBCA allows a proposal length of 500 words."' 
Before the statute was amended in 2001, there was a 200-word limit; 
however, it applied only to the optional supporting statement that may be 
included with the proposal. '^"' Under the amended CBCA, the 500-word 
ceiling applies to both the proposal and any supporting statement together. 
It has been argued that "[a]s a result, the total effect of the amendments 
may have been to increase the restrictions on the ability of shareholders to 
communicate both their proposals and a coherent rationale."^"' This is 
especially of concem in light of the asymmetrical approach reflected in the 
Act. Specifically, no express word limit is imposed on the written 
statement of reasons that management is required to provide i f it refuses to 
include a proposal in the proxy circular. 
CBCA, siipf a note X, ss. 137(1.1) and Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 
2001, SOR/2001-5I2, ss. 46 [Regulations]. 
'''CBCA, ibid,ss. 137(4). 
" ' This, in turn, may have a gendered effect. See Sarra, "The Gender Implications", 
supra note X at 467 (noting that women are more likely to be small investors). 
CBCA, supra note X, ss. 137(3); Regulations, ibid., s. 48. 
CBCA, ibid, (prior to the 2001 amendments). 
Janis Sarra, "Shareholders as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada 
Business Corporations A c f (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 52 at 68 [Sarra, "Shareholders as 
Winners"]. 
CBCA, supra note X, ss. 137(7). 
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Third, the CBCA permits management to exclude a proposal i f 
"substantially the same proposal" was submitted to a shareholder meeting 
in the preceding 5 years and it attracted less than 3 percent of the vote 
when initially submitted, 6 percent when next submitted and 10 percent 
when submitted for the third (and subsequent) time/s.^°^ This was 
modeled after a similar provision in the U.S. known as the "resubmission 
rule". Notwithstanding the proposal to the Power Corporation of Canada 
referenced above, it is reasonable to assume that diversity-related 
proposals, at the outset, may not receive substantial support. Part of the 
value of the proposal mechanism, however, is its communication fimction. 
By generating debate and raising the level of discourse within the 
corporation, it progressively plays an educative role and can cause 
otherwise passive shareholders to rethink their sometimes uncritical 
support of management. In attempting to subsequently reintroduce such 
proposals, with the hopes of galvanizing heightened levels of support, the 
proposing shareholder is thwarted by the Canadian equivalent of the 
resubmission rule. The provision, as it stands, perpetuates the 
misconception that socially conscious shareholders are "gadflies" who 
seek to abuse management through the proposal mechanism. 
Fourth, i f the corporation wishes to exclude a proposal, it must 
provide the proposing shareholder with written notice and a set of reasons 
for the exclusion.^ "'* However, an exclusion does not engage any 
regulatory oversight. Rather, i f a shareholder wants to dispute a decision 
to exclude, its only recourse is to seek a court's review.^ "^ This stands in 
contrast to the U.S. where, i f there is disagreement regarding whether a 
ground for exclusion is met, the onus lies with the corporation to satisfy 
the SEC that it acted lawfully. In Canada, both the legal and financial 
onus lie with the shareholder. As argued by the Social Investment 
Organization, "[m]any shareholders - such as foundations, private trusts 
and small mutual or pension funds - lack the legal and financial resources 
to mount a court battle. The effect of this will be to give management an 
arbitrary veto over shareholder proposals with no practical way for 
Ibid., ss. 137(5)(d); Regulations, supra note X, s. 51. 
CBCA, ibid, ss. 137(7). 
Ibid, ss. 137(8). 
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shareholders to appeal the exclusion." Having to seek approval before 
resorting to exclusion would help ensure that the firm gives thorough 
consideration to whether a proposal can legitimately be excluded, rather 
than merely rejecting the proposal as a matter of form and forcing the 
shareholder to seek a court's review. 
I should note that some U.S. academics are skeptical of the 
argument that rectifying legal impediments to the expression of 
shareholder voice will advance issues of racial justice in the corporation 
given, for example, that shareholder proposals are generally not binding 
on management.While I sympathize with this argument, there is 
certainly increasing evidence in Canada "suggest[ing] that today's 
proposals may become tomorrow's corporate policy".^''^ In other words, 
through the proposal submission process, and resulting dialogue between 
proposing shareholders and management, the formulation of corporate 
pohcy with respect to social issues has been fimdamentally influenced. In 
particular cases, shareholders have withdrawn their proposals after 
concluding successfiil negotiations with management.^ "' 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
In December 2008, the CSA released a proposed set of 9 broad 
corporate govemance principles that would apply to Canadian issuers. '^" 
Social Investment Organization, "Submission By the Social Investment Organization 
to the Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce Committee on Bill S-I9, An Act to Amend 
the Canada Business Corporations Act (May 3, 2000), online: 
<http://w\vvv.socialinvestment.ca/News&Archives/news-700-Senate-submission.htm>. 
See Joo, "Corporate Hierarchy", supra note X at 961 - 962. 
Sarra, "Shareholders as Winners", supra note X at 74 - 75. 
I have previously canvassed several examples of this trend. See Dhir, "Realigning", 
supra note X at 405 - 407 and Aaron A. Dhir, "The Politics of Knowledge 
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice and Human Rights" forthcoming 
in (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. at 29 - 31 of unpubhshed version (on file with author) 
[Dhir, "The Pohtics"]. 
"Request for Comment - Proposed Repeal and Replacement of NP 58-201 Corporate 
Governance Guidelines, NI 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, and 
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Documents such as these are performing an increasingly important 
function. Given the constraints of traditional regulatory models and 
conventional legal approaches, they reflect a movement towards a "new 
govemance" framework. The new govemance project seeks, in part, to 
transcend traditional punitive/deterrence-based measures^" and to focus 
instead on norm generation and the enhancement of "intemal self-
regulatory capacities". '^^  
The new policy document has been both lauded and critiqued for 
moving towards a more flexible principles-based approach, rather than 
consisting of prescribed practices/threshold requirements (as do the 
current C S A guidelines).^'^ The principles are accompanied by 
explanatory information and examples of practices that would achieve 
their objectives. Unfortunately, while mention is made of board 
"composition", "skills", "competencies", "integrity", "independent 
judgmenf, the fact that "[n]o individual...should dominate the board's 
decision-making", "evaluating the necessary and desirable competencies 
and other attributes of directors" and "identifying any gaps that exist on 
the board", the issue of heterogeneity is nowhere to be found.^''* Rather, 
when issuers consult the document in an effort to improve their 
N I 52-110 Audit Committees and Companion Policy 52-11 OOP Audit Committees", 
(2008) 31 OSCB 12158 ["Request for Comment"]. 
^" David Hess, "Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of 
Achieving Stakeholder Accountability through Transparency" (2007) 17:3 Business 
Ethics Quarterly 453 at 453. 
Orly Lobel, "The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Govemance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 at 365. See also Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, ""New Governance" In Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471 at 473 ("This 
scholarship endeavors simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize, and 
advocate a seismic reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the tools 
employed in policy implementation. The valence of this reorientation.. .is generally away 
from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-iiile regulation by administrative fiat, 
and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-
solving New Govemance."). 
Barbara Shecter, "CSA Implements Broad Directives for Good Corporate 
Governance" Financial Post {21 December 2008), online: 
<http://www.financialpost.com/stoi-v.html?id=l 102205>. 
"Request for Comment", supra note X at 12173 - 12175. 
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governance practices they will find a set of principles and related text that 
stick to the standard refrains and fail to provide even a measure of 
diversity-related normative content. 
This is particularly discouraging given that earlier attempts to 
articulate effective organizing principles for Canadian corporate 
govemance planted the seeds of such content. For example, the 1994 Dey 
Report supported "the constitution of boards...with a variety of 
backgrounds" and stated that "diversity has many advantages in the board 
decision-making process." '^^  A subsequent 5-year review of the Dey 
Report's recommendations makes more explicit reference to "[d]iversity 
of the board with respect to gender and race." '^^  And in 2001 , the Saucier 
Report recommended that boards "should actively look beyond traditional 
sources in seeking" directors and that "[d]iversity of background and 
experience can add value to boardroom deliberations."^" 
Canadian regulators should also be mindful of govemance 
principles and recommendations made in other jurisdictions. For example, 
in the U.K., the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned an independent inquiry into 
the purpose and efficacy of non-executive directors. The resulting 2003 
Higgs Report makes specific recommendations aimed at widening the 
scope of candidates for board positions, which is partially aimed at 
addressing low levels of gender diversity.^'^ Also, the Swedish Code of 
Corporate Govemance advises that the board "is to have an appropriate 
Report of the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Coiporate Governance in 
Canada, "Where were the Directors?: GuideUnes for Improved Governance in Canada" 
(December 1994) at 30. 
Institute of Corporate Directors & Toronto Stock Exchange, "Report on Corporate 
Governance, 1999: Five Years to the Dey" (1999) at 6. 
Joint Committee on Coiporate Governance, "Beyond Compliance: Building a 
Governance Culture" (November 2001) at 15. See also A Statement of the Canadian 
Council of Chief Executives, "Governance, Values and Competitiveness: A Commitment 
to Leadership" (September 2002) at 18 ("each board should...[e]nsure...it takes into 
account... factors including candidates'...personal qualities, and the benefits of 
diversity"). 
Derek Higgs, "Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors" 
(January 2003) at paragraphs 10.25 to 10.31. 
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composition, exhibiting diversity and breadth in the directors' 
quahfications, experience and background" and that "[a]n equal gender 
distribution on the board is to be an aim."^" 
It should be noted that one of the consequences of regulators and 
firms choosing to ignore board diversity issues is the possibility of direct 
intervention by the state. The most striking example of this sort of 
traditional, command-and-control style of regulation is seen in Norway. 
Recent revisions to Norwegian corporate law require public limited 
liability companies to comply with varying degrees of gender 
representation, depending on the size of the board. For example, i f a 
board has 9 members, at least 4 must be women. I f the number exceeds 9, 
at least 40 percent must be women.^^° Facing possible court-enforced 
involuntary dissolution, it appears that all Norwegian issuers complied 
with the provisions by April 2008.^^^ Similar initiatives are currently 
underway in jurisdictions such as Switzerland, where a Bill proposing a 30 
percent gender quota is scheduled to be debated in the Swiss federal 
parhament in the Spring of 2009.^^^ In Spain, while not mandatory, 
legislation expressly recommends that reporting issuers "endeavour to 
include a sufficient number or women on their boards to reach a balanced 
presence of women and men".^ '^* While these jurisdictions may not be 
identical to Canada, Canadian issuers should be cognizant of their 
experiences. Indeed, the idea of corporate diversity quotas is not 
^" "Swedisti Code of Corporate Governance" (Stockliolm 2005) at para. 3.2.1. 
''"Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, 1997, Del K : l , ss. 6-1 la. 
'" Ibid.axss. 6-15. 
" ' "Representation of Both Sexes on Company Boards", online: Norwegian Ministiy of 
Children and Equality 
<http://\TO'w.regieringen.no/en/dep/bld/Topics/Equalitv/rules-on-gender-representation-
on compan.litml?id=416864>. 
"Accroitre Le Pourcentage Des Femmes Dans Les Conseils D'administration Des 
Entreprises Dont L'etat Est Actionnaire", online: The Federal Assembly - The Swiss 
Parliament 
<http://www.parlament.ch/E/Suche/Pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch id=20030440> (in 
French only). 
" ' Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality between Women and 
Men, 2007, Article 75. 
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completely foreign to Canadian discourse, having been recently suggested 
by participants in a Govemment of Canada initiative on discrimination in 
the workplace 
V. AVENUES F O R FUTURE INQUIRY AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
A . AVENUES FOR FUTURE INQUIRY 
Moving forward, various issues surrounding corporate board 
composition, law and diversity remain underexplored and merit future 
research. I will mention 4 now. First, in continuing to develop new 
govemance-style mechanisms to achieve heterogeneity, is there a role to 
be played by enhancing corporate disclosure? Would requiring the 
submission of diversity-related information to investors be usefial not only 
in terms of galvanizing shareholder advocacy, but also in terms of having 
a positive impact on how firms are managed? Put another way, rather than 
following the lead of jurisdictions such as Norway, would requiring firms 
to disclose the lack of representation on their boards (both the actual 
reporting and the process of information gathering) lead to managerial 
self-reflection and accompanying behavioural modification?^^^ 
See John Samuel and Associates Inc., "Summary Report on Engagement Sessions for 
a Racism-Free Workplace" (prepared for the Labour Program of Human Resources and 
Social Development Canada) (March 2006), online: 
<http://w\vw,hrsdc.KC.ca/eng/lp/lo/lswe/we/special projects/RacismFreelnitiative/consuit 
ation-2005/FQcusGroup.shtml> ("Some suggested that there should be a requirement to 
include members of visible minorities on the boards of directors of major corporations. 
An example was provided from South Africa's successfiil Black Business Empowennent 
program, under which every company must have at least one Black person on the board 
of directors"). 
See Richard A. Bernardi, David F. Bean & ICristen M. Weippert, "Minority 
Membership on Boards of Directors: The Case for Requiring Pictures of Boards in 
Annual Reports" (2005) 16 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1019 at 1019 
("[e]mpirical evidence is presented that shows a significant increase in the presence of 
ethnic minorities and females when pictures of board members are included in annual 
reports. We suggest that requiring pictures of board members in annual reports and 
regulatory fihngs would result in a larger presence for gender and race diversity on 
boards of directors"). 
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Second, turning to tlie transnational level, can it be argued that a 
state's corporate law policies should be analyzed through an intemational 
human rights lens? For example, Canada - like New Zealand - has 
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women ("CEDAW").^^' In reviewing the latter state party's 
comphance with CEDAW, the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women has expressed concern 
about private sector gender inequality and urged New Zealand to 
"strengthen its policies in supporting the private sector's efforts towards 
the promotion of women in decision-making positions" 
Third, in mnning the affairs of the corporation, Canadian directors 
(and officers) must "act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation".^^' Recently developments in corporate law 
jurispmdence suggest that in discharging this fiduciary obligation, 
directors are permitted to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders such as creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, the 
environment, the broader community etc.^ "^ As I have discussed 
elsewhere, there are numerous practical and conceptual difficulties that 
accompany this development.^ '^ However, setting these aside, the reality 
is that while directors are not under a legal obligation to act in this manner, 
doing so will not result in a violation of the fiduciary duty. This represents 
a shift in the way fiduciaiy obligations have been conceptualized under 
Canadian corporate law given prior jurispmdence that interpreted the 
'"December 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.TS. 13. 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
"Fifth Periodic Report, New Zealand, Concluding Observations: 29th Session" (2003) at 
para. 407 - 408, onhne: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<http://w\vw2.ohcln-.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/NewZealandC029.pdf> 
[emphasis added]. 
CBCA, supra note X, ss. 122(l)(a). Parallel provisions exist in provincial corporate 
law statutes. See, for example, Busmess Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, ss. 
134(l)(a). 
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 42; 
BCE Inc., supra note X at paras. 39 - 40. 
Dhir, "The Politics", supra note X at 35 - 36. 
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phrase "best interests of the corporation" as being synonymous with 
maximizing shareholder retum.^ ^^ 
This, I think, should be of interest to human rights advocates.^ ''^  
The overseas operations of Canadian corporations are continually 
impugned for their human rights-related impacts.^ '^* These concems have 
focused primarily on the Canadian extractive industry. Canada has listed 
on its stock exchanges more mining firms that any other state.^ ^^  
Globally, these exchanges represent "the world's largest source of equity 
capital for mining exploration and production both in Canada and 
abroad."^ ^^ Interestingly, when one disaggregates board composition 
statistics by industry, extractive companies are among the worst in terms 
of gender representation.^ '^ ' This is particularly noteworthy given studies 
suggesting that boards with a critical mass of female directors are more 
likely to be attuned to non-shareholder interests.^ ''^  
Saixa, "Class Act", supra note X at n. 98 (citing various Ontario and Saskatchewan 
decisions). 
Similarly, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, "The Board As A Path Toward Corporate Social 
Responsibility" in D. McBamet, A. Voiculescu & T. Campbell (eds). The New Coi-porate 
Accoiintabihty: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) at 280 (arguing that "the most likely way for proponents of CSR 
to achieve their goals is to recast their issues as issues of coiporate governance"). 
For a review of the criticisms see Dhir, "The Politics", supra note X at 5 - 7. 
National Roundtables on Coiporate Social Responsibihty and the Canadian Extractive 
Industry in Developing Countries, "Advisory Group Report" (29 March 2007), online: 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 
<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/librarv/Advisorv%20Group%20Report%20-
%20IVlarch%202007.pdft> at 3 (citation omitted). 
'''Ibid 
Catalyst, "2007 Catalyst Census", supra note X at I I . 
See for example, Kr'amer, "Critical Mass", supra note X at 10 ("Women directors are 
also more likely to broaden the content of boardroom discussions to consider the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders who have an impact on and are impacted by the 
company's performance.. .Though these may be considered "softer" issues by some, the 
women directors and CEOs we intei-viewed saw them as business matters"). 
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Fourth, and related to number 3, given the presence of Canadian 
corporations in a globalized market - and the associated allegations of 
complicity in developing world human rights deprivations - should 
consideration be given to internationalizing the boards of multinational 
firms? From a business perspective, some have argued that boards 
consisting of members from a range of states and areas are becoming 
integral to successful operations .^ '^ From a rights-based perspective, the 
contemporary multinational enterprise is viewed by some as an agent of 
neocolonialism and part of the ""recolonization" of the apparently 
decolonized by the imperial centre of the global capitalist project."^''" I f 
there is merit to this claim, query as to whether addressing board 
composition may play at least some role in addressing these concems: 
A corporation cannot be tmly global until its board reflects 
the countries and regions in which it operates...this 
requires eliminating colonial thinking from boardrooms, 
which are invariably dominated by people from the home 
country. I f innovation is global and can change how 
companies are managed, and i f skills are a key part of the 
new enterprise, then it should start with boards...corporate 
boards exhibit nationalism, xenophobia and anti-
modemism...Their lack of exposure to and ability to 
communicate with different cultures and attitudes 
hamstring them: colonialists sought to manage the world 
without the worldly experience - and to protect national 
interests - and eveiy one else had to fit in.^'" 
Alex Mandl, "Risky but Rewarding: Globalizing the Board" (2004) 9:2 Global 
Governance 13 at 13. 
John S. Saul, Decolonization and Empire (Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2008) at 49. 
Chandran Nair, "Muhinationals and Responsibility - Cracking the Colonial Corporate 
Culture" (31 August 2006), online: Ethical Corporation 
<htlp://vvww.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentlD=4483>. 
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B . CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In terms of diversity, the corporate govemance landscape in 
Canada is grim. The statistics on board composition reveal a culture of 
widespread gender and racial homogeneity. The evidence does not 
support businesses' perception of a pool problem; rather, it appears that a 
more fruitful explanation can be rooted in the cognitive processes and 
stmctures that inform corporate decision-making. Attempts by Canadian 
civil society organizations and others to cast board diversification in terms 
of organizational performance can be grounded in the empirical literature 
to date. However, it appears that Canadian firms may be perpetuating 
environments that actively stifle factors which might otherwise enable 
them to successfully leverage diversity. Further, the market-based 
approach is not without complication. And while it is certainly attractive 
in terms of carrying currency as a political strategy, it should be advanced 
with great care. In considering avenues for reform, particular aspects of 
the legal culture and practice that shape the director nomination process, 
shareholder proposals and existing govemance principles require 
reconsideration. As currently formulated, they may ultimately serve to 
facilitate board homogeneity and to undermine fiiture diversificafion 
efforts. It is hoped that progress on these fronts will be the first step 
towards a more inclusive and equitable corporate govemance edifice. 
